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I. Executive Summary
This paper summarises the results of a study which examined international experience
with regard to community-based health financing (CBHF) schemes, scaling up CBHF
schemes, and the feasibility of scaling up community-based health insurance (CBHI) in
Armenia. It was based on a literature review of international experience and qualitative
research in Armenia.The recommendations derived from this study have relevance both
for Armenia and for the use of CBHI schemes as a tool for promoting pro-poor health
system reform in low-resource settings more generally.
The literature review of CBHI
Instituting health financing systems based on tax or social health insurance – which
achieve high levels of risk pooling and are able to provide services accessible to all on
the basis of need – has proved difficult in low-income countries.1 In much of the
developing world, governments are unable to raise sufficient revenue to finance essential
health care. The widespread introduction of user fees in an attempt to bridge this gap has
led to inequity of access and rising out-of-pocket expenditure, which in turn has led to
less pooling of resources or sharing of risk;2 the cost of an episode of care is borne entirely
by the individual and their family. Formal and informal out-of-pocket expenditure is now
a major cause of poverty.3
Community-based health financing (CBHF) schemes provide some protection from
the impoverishing effects of unpredictable expenditure due to illness.4 There is
increasing international interest in scaling up CBHF, and a developing consensus on the
scheme characteristics that are essential for success. However, there are constraints to
scaling up CBHF related to: the political, social and cultural context within which
CBHF schemes operate; generic problems with insurance; scheme design and
management problems; and a lack of integration with the broader health care system.
Japan, China, Korea, Taiwan and Germany provide historic examples of countries that
have overcome these constraints and successfully scaled up CBHF schemes as part of a
move towards universal health insurance. There are also contemporary examples of
countries that have used CBHF as a mechanism for making progress towards universal
access and protection, including Thailand and Indonesia. Most of these countries have
followed a strategy of gradual expansion of voluntary CBHF schemes for the informal
sector and compulsory health insurance for the formal sector. Over time, schemes are
expanded to other groups or merged into larger health insurance funds. However,
economic development and political stewardship remain prerequisites for achieving
universal health insurance coverage.
The experience of countries that have scaled up CBHF schemes suggests that
providing incentives to join them is vital. Service quality (relative to other treatment
options) has an impact on participation in voluntary schemes, as the Thai experience
shows, while experience in China, Thailand, Vietnam, Indonesia, and Korea all point to
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affordability being a major constraint. High co-payments and informal user fees make
schemes less attractive to join. The extent to which services are provided locally is
another key factor (China, Thailand). The effectiveness of communication strategies is
also important – the benefits of voluntary CBHF schemes need to be marketed. Levels
of social capital also have a significant impact, and community involvement in scheme
operation is essential for maintaining accountability and trust in the schemes. Increasing
management capacity is essential to sustainability.
As schemes are scaled up, the development of regional umbrella groups able to
provide the necessary technical and managerial support is needed to reduce reliance on
external capacity. Government stewardship and action is needed as CBHI is scaled up,
to broker a consensus on policy objectives, to develop a legal framework, and to
implement practice guidelines and quality control mechanisms. Sustained government
or donor financial and institutional support for the schemes is increasingly recognised to
be necessary; the withdrawal of such support in China led to the collapse of the
Cooperative Medical System. Significant subsidies ranging from 50% to 100% are
required to enable access for the poorest people; even mature social insurance systems
require government subsidies, as shown by Western European experience. Links to
broader development and advocacy initiatives strengthen CBHF schemes via increasing
local incomes, realising synergies in terms of increased technical and managerial
capacity, and capitalising on already established trust relationships between NGOs and
communities.
Integration between schemes and different levels of clinical service delivery can
significantly strengthen schemes and facilitate an increase in the quality and scope of
services they can deliver. Introducing mechanisms to control adverse selection – such as
enrolment on a family basis or compulsory membership – is vital to ensure both control
of costs and adequate risk pooling. As community-based health insurance schemes are
expanded, managing financial instability becomes more important, including:
combining small schemes and introducing compulsory membership to increase cross-
subsidisation (Korea, Taiwan, Japan, Germany); government underwriting; and re-
insurance.
Attempts to scale-up CBHI must find a balance between delivering care that meets
communities’ needs and ensuring that the cost of joining schemes remains affordable.
There is also a tension between maximising health outcomes by prioritising preventative
and primary health care services (which benefit the poorest groups most), and providing
protection against catastrophic health expenditure via covering hospital care (which
affects the poorest groups most). Schemes should continue to evolve over time and be
flexible enough to respond to new economic and social realities, changes in morbidity
and demographics, and reforming health systems.
I. Executive summary        9
Scaling up community insurance in Armenia: qualitative study
Health system reform in the Armenian context
Since independence, Armenia has experienced a severe economic contraction
leading to collapse in government revenue and a 35% decline in health expenditure.
The Armenian government was forced to introduce user fees, and by 1999 only 25% of
total health expenditure was still government funded. Out-of-pocket expenditure due to
formal user fees and informal payments increased to about 60% of total health care
expenditure; the remaining 15% of health care funding was from external sources.
Despite the introduction of a state-funded Basic Benefits Package (BBP) seeking to
cover vulnerable groups and priority public health services, utilisation rates have
declined dramatically.
Armenia has begun radical reform of its health system, including enhancing the role
of primary health care and introducing family medicine. Other key reform areas have
included decentralisation and the introduction of market mechanisms. There are also
plans to replace the tax-based health financing with a national compulsory social health
insurance, although the feasibility of doing so is constrained by economic circumstances.
The Ministry of Health has retained a planning and regulatory role. The independent
State Health Agency (SHA) now acts as the sole purchaser of publicly financed care in
accordance with the basic benefits package, which is supposed to provide free access to
essential health care for vulnerable groups. However, reimbursements are significantly
lower than the real treatment costs. As a result, despite some improvements in both
access and quality of care, the impact of reforms to date has been limited at the most
peripheral levels of the health system; poor rural communities still face access barriers.
The Oxfam (GB) CBHI schemes in Armenia
In Armenia, in response to inadequate government financing of basic PHC services,
Oxfam has pioneered community-based health insurance (CBHI) schemes. These aim
to address gaps in provision, while reducing the impact of unpredictable out-of-pocket
expenses on households. Since 1995, Oxfam GB, in partnership with local NGO
“Support to Communities”, has been running schemes in Vayots Dzor and Syunik marz.
These regions were chosen because they are poor with an agricultural economy, and are
relatively inaccessible due to mountainous geography and poor public transport links. By
2001, schemes were operational in 80 villages – about 10% of rural communities in
Armenia – and covered around 50,000 people. Currently, if the schemes covered by
World Vision in partnership with Support to Communities are included, schemes are
operating in 128 villages and cover 80,000 people. Prior to the establishment of the
schemes, basic health care was provided via village-based health posts that were under-
resourced and staffed by poorly paid nurses with little support and minimal ongoing
education. These nurses were poorly motivated and the quality of care they could offer
was low. Outreach services from higher PHC levels had largely ceased.
The schemes aim to provide essential primary health care, via the village health posts,
that is affordable, equitable, and accessible to all, especially the very poor. In return for
a fixed quarterly contribution of 2,000 Armenian drams per family (about US$ 4.5), the
schemes cover unlimited first aid, basic PHC and drugs, and some referral to higher level
facilities. However, the health post nurses are only able to deliver a limited scope of care
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due to legislative restrictions on their prescribing and clinical role. To overcome this
constraint, outreach visits to the villages by ambulatory-based doctors have been
facilitated. The Oxfam CBHI model promotes community involvement in the financial
management of schemes via accountable and transparent local management structures,
and exemption procedures cover on average 10% of scheme members. They have
created two Healthcare Foundations in Vayots Dzor and Syunik which have started to
provide overall supervision and technical support to the schemes. Evaluations of the
Oxfam CBHI schemes have demonstrated both benefits and limitations.
As well as the Oxfam-supported schemes, there are also other PHC-focused CBHI
schemes in Armenia supported by World Vision, Mission East, and Future Generations
Union/N(o)vib. Most of these schemes are currently planning to increase their
coverage. With maturity and expansion of community-based PHC financing schemes in
Armenia, questions regarding their long-term sustainability and policy implications
arise. Their financial sustainability is threatened by the increasing prevalence of chronic
illness and a lack of long-term government or donor subsidy. There are significant
affordability barriers to joining the schemes. Non-communicable diseases often require
treatment at secondary care level, imposing demands on the CBHI schemes to
coordinate responses at primary and secondary levels of care. The prospects for
institutional sustainability of community-driven schemes in view of national financing
reforms and governance issues at the regional and national level is also unclear.
Primary health care reform in Armenia
Primary health care is a stated government priority, and there have been significant
recent increases in the budget allocation for PHC. While there have been significant
improvements, the impact of reforms has been patchy. Some areas have benefited, but
there has been little impact at the most peripheral levels of the health system where
access to PHC and drugs remains problematic. Significant PHC reform issues still need
to be addressed in the areas of health information systems and coordination. In terms of
financing mechanisms, ensuring that funds follow patients, that remuneration is linked
to performance, and increasing funding and service delivery at peripheral levels of the
PHC system are key challenges. There is also a recognised need for further
rationalisation, and investment in infrastructure and human resources. There is a need
to further develop evidence-based clinical treatment guidelines and to incorporate them
into a standard treatment manual; both are central to ongoing efforts to improve quality
of care. Legislative changes to facilitate the ongoing development of CBHI in Armenia
will also be required. There are a large number of ongoing initiatives at the PHC level,
such as the World Bank’s Primary Health Care Development Program and a variety of
donor-funded initiatives, which have significant implications for CBHI in Armenia and
provide the opportunity for CBHI schemes to develop strategic partnerships.
The qualitative research revealed a consensus that CBHI was compatible with the
longer-term health policy objectives and national health priorities. The objectives
suggested for CBHI in Armenia included: increasing access to care for isolated rural
communities and improving the quality of care available at the most peripheral levels of
the health system; increasing community involvement in the organisation of PHC and
facilitating community input into the broader health policy debates; facilitating the
introduction of compulsory social health insurance; raising additional revenue for PHC;
and sharing responsibility for health between the state and communities. However, there
are important constraints to scaling up CBHI. In particular, there is opposition from
entrenched interest groups including specialists – who would lose significant income
from informal fees and have quality of care concerns – as well as some hospital and
polyclinic administrators. There is also a need to secure long-term subsidies to ensure the
financial viability of CBHI. 
The CBHI-supported health posts are the usual point of first contact with the health
system for both members and non-members of the schemes. The health post nurses are
able to provide first aid and symptomatic relief and they fulfil an important advisory,
triage and referral function; by giving people advice as to the seriousness of their health
problem and the urgency with which it should be dealt with, nurses enable patients to
make more informed decisions about how important it is for them to access higher levels
of care. However, the health posts currently offer only a limited package of services that
does not include chronic disease management, preventative services such as screening
for hypertension and diabetes (immunisation is a notable exception), or curative
services; this was seen as a major problem. The increasing use of scheme-supported
outreach visits from specialist and ambulatory-based family medicine practitioners is
helping to remedy this. The limited package of care, which does not cover hospital care,
does not provide protection against catastrophic health expenditure.
Services that should be strengthened at the health post level include: maternal and
child health services; family planning; chronic disease care; simple curative care;
preventative care; and the diagnosis and treatment of STIs. Other services that rural
communities have difficulty accessing include specialist care, dental care, and mental
health services. Significant broader health system constraints continue to affect care
delivery at the most peripheral levels, including degraded infrastructure (health
facilities, roads, water, and sanitation infrastructure) as well as significant human
resource constraints. Doctors and nurses have become de-skilled and need retraining to
enable them to deliver better quality care; progress in this direction has begun via a
variety of PHC reform initiatives.
There are also significant knowledge barriers to accessing care. Poor health
knowledge, reluctance on the part of individuals to take responsibility for their own
health, health damaging behaviour (unsafe sex, poor diets, smoking, alcohol and drug
abuse) and late treatment seeking were identified by many key informants as problems
that needed to be addressed. A lack of knowledge within communities about their
entitlements under the Basic Benefits Package was also identified as a problem.
Financing rural PHC in Armenia
There are significant financial barriers at all levels of the health system to rural
communities accessing care, as the result of widespread poverty, and formal and informal
user fees. Informal payments are endemic at the hospital level and for accessing specialist
care – they result in people borrowing money and selling assets to pay for care or
foregoing care altogether. Financial barriers are exacerbated by geographical barriers; the
cost of the transport needed to access higher level care is high.
Resource allocation mechanisms are recognised to be weak, and rural health posts are
currently not receiving the funding that they are entitled to, although there have been
some recent improvements. The BBP rarely functions as it is intended to, and often
services that are supposed to be free under the BBP are not. This is seen to stem from
unrealistic funding of the essential care package compounded by increasing demand –
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the resulting deficit is met through formal and informal out-of-pocket payments from
users. Funding for providers under the BBP package is based on a simple capitation
formula. There are currently no mechanisms to weight payments according to
demographic data, poverty, isolation, or burden of disease. The MoH accepts the need
to introduce weighted capitation as part of a mixed provider payment system to create a
better incentive mix directly linked to quality. However, until the inadequacies of
existing health information systems are addressed, this will not be possible.
There are significant weaknesses in existing health information systems and in the
management and integration of data. This is a major constraint to linking provider
reimbursement to the delivery of specific services or to quality of care. In general, there
are weak links between remuneration of providers and the services provided. It is not
possible to link capitation payments directly to individual patients; money does not
follow patients. This prevents patient choice acting as an incentive for providers to
deliver better quality services. There are moves to address these issues, such as the
USAID/PADCO pilot projects in Lori Marz and Yerevan which have introduced
performance-related incentives.
Evidence-based treatment guidelines based on the Essential Drugs List (EDL) have
been approved for approximately 20 conditions and the World Bank has developed
national guidelines on quality of care, although to date these have had little impact on
prescriber behaviour. There have been significant problems with drug procurement and
distribution, and inadequate drug supplies have had a significant impact on service
utilisation. There are only weak central procurement or competitive tendering
mechanisms; scope to realise significant savings exists. While there is an EDL, there is
no legislation requiring practitioners to prescribe EDL drugs, and in practice it is not
widely used. Prescriber behaviour currently has relatively little impact on overall
patterns of drug consumption; the majority of prescription-only drugs are in fact sold
over the counter in pharmacies without a prescription – this is in breech of existing
legislation but is tolerated by the government because self-treatment is the only care
option for many people.
Recommendations for scaling up CBHI and propoor health
care financing in Armenia
Planning for scaling up CBHI 
• Comparisons with other countries and the results of the qualitative research suggest
that there is a role for expanded community-based health insurance in Armenia. 
• The objectives and priorities of community-based health insurance schemes must be
defined before scaling them up because they will affect scheme design and the level 
of investment required. 
• Key stakeholders should be identified, with a view to securing their support for the 
process, and involving them in future advocacy.
• Establishing a national forum for rural health and CBHI would be useful to discuss 
experience with CBHI as well as rural health issues more generally. 
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Financing pro-poor PHC and expanded CBHI schemes
• Resource allocations for rural PHC should increase.
• Informal payments cannot be tolerated and should be reduced.
• Government and donor subsidies have an essential role to play in financially 
sustaining community financing to enable subsidies for the poor. Subsidies in the 
range of 50-100% of membership costs would be required to ensure that the poorest 
are able to join CBHI schemes.
• CBHI schemes should be a component of a broader inter-sectoral development 
strategy.
• Increasing the amount of revenue generated locally by CBHI schemes is severely 
constrained by the levels of poverty and economic development in rural 
communities.
• Mechanisms will need to be developed to prevent financial instability and increase 
risk pooling during scaling up.
• In terms of population coverage, poor and isolated rural communities should remain
the primary target group for CBHI. Voluntary membership of the CBHI is the only 
acceptable option currently.
• Determinants of participation in CBHI schemes in Armenia must be monitored in 
order to promote enrolment and fine-tune social marketing strategies seeking to 
expand membership. The major factors affecting membership and recommendations
to address them are:
➙ Affordability – this is the major determinant of participation emphasised by 
non-members, hence the need for subsidies.
➙ Geographical proximity of services – outreach specialist services and 
expanded service delivery at the health posts is strongly advocated.
➙ Social capital issues – there are high levels of social capital within 
communities, but lower solidarity across communities. This, together with a 
mistrust of government organisations, will make it hard to introduce district 
or regional risk pools and thus constrains scaling up CBHI. It should be 
addressed via information campaigns, involvement of trusted organisations 
(such as Oxfam and STC) and community representation on financial and 
administrative management boards.
➙ Quality of care – improving the quality of care will be essential for 
encouraging membership.
• The benefits package should continue to focus on covering gaps in existing public 
provision of services. The current focus of the schemes on low cost, high frequency 
care is appropriate. Without significant increases in subsidies to the schemes, the 
scope for increasing financial protection is limited. Future increases in the scope of 
the benefits package should focus initially on increasing the scope of PHC services 
covered, with partial cover of hospital-related costs being the next logical expansion.
• Increasing the scope of services delivered by CBHI schemes and enhancing quality 
of care will require significant investment in human resources. Training to enable 
the introduction of formally accredited ‘nurse practitioners’ able to deliver a wide 
range of services is strongly recommended; it would also require changes to existing 
legislation. This process could be facilitated through direct support and supervision 
by PHC physicians or ‘rural health teams’ consisting of ambulatory doctors and 
nurses, linked to specialists, family practitioners, and midwives. 
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• Motivating health providers working under CBHI schemes: this could be achieved 
through providing health post nurses with a living wage as well as financial and 
non-financial incentives, including mechanisms to ensure holidays and sick leave 
for health post nurses.
• Quality of care requirements: the government and Medical Associations should 
define quality standards, develop treatment and prescribing protocols, improve the 
regulatory environment, and develop quality assurance strategies such as the 
introduction of peer review. A standard treatment manual for rural practitioners 
(not just in CBHI) should be developed and integrated into ongoing training.
• More efficient purchasing and distribution of drugs: centralised purchasing and 
distribution of drugs could achieve significant cost savings. Other strategies to 
achieve savings and improved drug availability include: prescribing and 
procurement linked to essential drug lists; the use of generic drugs; procurement via 
competitive tendering; improved storage; and coordinated (or centralised) 
distribution.
Scaling up and integration of CBHI: towards institutional sustainability
• It is a strongly held view of communities and key stakeholders that ownership of 
CBHI schemes should remain independent of the government. 
• The development of regional umbrella organisations modelled on the STC 
foundations will be required to ensure the necessary technical support as CBHI is 
scaled up.
• Institutionalising adaptability of CBHF schemes to the changing context is central 
to sustainability and their scaling up. Adjusting the scope of benefits covered 
according to the economic environment will be required. Management structures 
and premium levels have to evolve as schemes become more complex.
• The health system itself poses constraints to successfully scaling up community-
based health insurance schemes. There is a range of issues linked to quality of care, 
efficiency and cost-efficacy that must be dealt with if the introduction of 
community-based health insurance is to have an impact. An enabling environment 
must be created via the implementation at a national level of health policy 
initiatives that include investment in infrastructure and human resources.
• Scaling up CBHI cannot be done in isolation from integration of CBHI within the 
broader health system, and there should be stronger integration of clinical services 
delivered at different levels. 
• An expanding CBHI needs to be marketed; ongoing information and 
communication strategies need to be developed to encourage membership.
• Integrated health information systems would support expansion.
• Improved communication, coordination and partnerships between NGOs, donors 
and government departments involved in CBHI and PHC financing is needed.
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II. Preface
This report is based on research, funded by Oxfam (GB) and carried out by the London
School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, which examined the evidence base on
community-based health financing and international experience of scaling it up. Qualitative
research was also undertaken in Armenia, which is currently considering scaling up
community-based health insurance (CBHI) as part of a longer term policy of introducing
compulsory social health insurance (SHI). This research sought to identify the major
constraints and opportunities for scaling up CBHI in Armenia. It explored the extent to
which CBHI expansion is feasible and desirable given health system and funding
constraints, societal values and the existing policy environment within Armenia. The
acceptability of the schemes from a community perspective and the determinants of
participation were also examined. Many of our findings will be relevant to other countries
from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union as well as resource-poor environments
more generally.

III. The Literature Review of CBHI
Methodology and scope of the literature review
The literature review was focused on two questions:
1. What is the role of community-based health financing (CBHF) in raising revenue,
risk  pooling to protect against the costs of illness, and providing equitable access
to health services for previously excluded populations?
2. Can CBHF act as a financial and organisational basis for widening access to 
services as countries move towards expanding coverage, and ultimately,
universal coverage of the population?
To answer these questions electronic databases of peer-reviewed journal publications
were searched including: BIDS (CAB abstracts; IBSS); Web of Science; PubMed; and
Embase. Databases for non-journal / grey literature were also searched including: ELDIS /
ID21; SIGLE. Additional sources were identified through tracing references and via
personal communications. The Internet websites of organisations active in the area of
community health financing were searched directly including:
1. World Bank (http://www.worldbank.org/)
2. International Labour Organisation (http://www.ilo.org/)
3. WHO (http://www.who.int/en/)
4. CMH (http://www.cmhealth.org/)
5. PHRplus (http://www.phrplus.org/)
6. ID21 Health (http://www.id21.org/health/index.html)
7. Institute of Development Studies (http://www.ids.ac.uk/ids/index.html)
8. HLSP (http://www.hlspinstitute.org/)
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Introduction
The literature search identified many studies published in peer-reviewed journals or
reports by international agencies addressing the role of community-based health
financing (CBHF) in raising revenue, risk pooling, and providing equitable access to
health services. The majority of these studies are cross-sectional – they describe
individual schemes at a point in time – and sought to measure scheme performance
and/or investigate the determinants of performance in terms of scheme design and
implementation. Some have asked broader questions regarding the role of CBHF in
terms of raising revenue and providing financial protection against the costs of illness,
and the design features of community-based financing schemes that contribute to
success in these areas.
There are a few significant low- or middle-income countries (Indonesia, Thailand,
Vietnam, and China) where CBHF has played a role in widening access to services and
financial protection as countries move towards expanding insurance coverage. There are
also historical examples from the developed world – Germany, Japan and Korea – where
some form of community financing has played a role in national plans for the gradual
extension and standardisation of national health insurance systems. A few reviews and
conceptual studies touch on these issues, and some theoretical frameworks for scaling up
CBHF have been developed that highlight the importance of integrating scaled up
schemes with the broader health system. 
A number of authors have pointed out weaknesses in the evidence base on CBHF. 5,6,7,8
There are no studies examining the health impact of introducing CBHF schemes
through randomised control trials or other quantitative methods. This is not particularly
surprising given the expense of carrying out such studies, as well as the methodological
and practical challenges involved. There are no cost-benefit studies comparing the
introduction of a CBHI with alternative interventions,6 and no ‘before and after’ study
designs (studies assessing the impact of an intervention) or studies that examine a CBHF
scheme repeatedly over time (which are necessary to draw conclusions about long-term
sustainability and impact). There is a need for more evidence based on quantitative
analysis of household-level data to enable definitive conclusions to be drawn with
respect to social protection and equity.7 From a policy point of view, these are serious
weaknesses. However, while there is a recognised need for further research, there is a
growing consensus that CBHF schemes do have a role to play in health care financing
in low-income environments. There remain, however, significant dissenting voices.
Results from the literature review
General definition and major characteristics of CBHF schemes
CBHF schemes are called by a number of different names including: community-
based health insurance schemes, community-based health organisations, mutual health
organisations (in Anglophone West Africa), and mutuelles de santé (in Francophone
West Africa). One of the problems frequently identified by authors assessing the
strengths and weaknesses of community-based health financing (CBHF) is the lack of a
widely accepted definition as to what constitutes CBHF. 8, 9
Box 1. Some definitions of communitybased health financing
There is a bewildering array of schemes that differ in terms of their objectives, design,
and implementation as well as the contexts within which they have developed. There
are, however, some common characteristics (Box 1). Central to most definitions of
CBHF is “the predominant role of collective action in raising, pooling, allocating or purchasing,
and supervising the management of health financing arrangements”.13 Other authors arrive at
definitions related to the nature of the beneficiary group; CBHF schemes are in general
aimed at people with no other access to collective financing arrangements who
therefore lack financial protection against the costs of illness.7,14 Another common
feature is that the schemes are mostly voluntary and membership is usually on a
prepayment basis. CBHF schemes also tend to be based on traditions of self-help and
community solidarity.7,8
Fund ownership and management can also be used to differentiate schemes (hospital,
community, craft or workplace cooperatives, NGO, government), and the type of
ownership is closely correlated with both the underlying motivation for setting up
CBHF schemes and the services that they provide.8
"CBHF schemes share the goal of finding ways for communities to meet their health
financing needs through pooled revenue collection and resource allocation decisions made
by the community. CBHF schemes are a form of insurance: they allow members to pay
small premiums on a regular basis to offset the risk of needing to pay large health care
fees upon falling sick. However, unlike many insurance schemes, CBHF schemes are
typically based on the concepts of mutual aid and social solidarity." (PHRplus, 2004)10
"Community financing can be broadly defined as any scheme that has three features:
community control, voluntary membership, and prepayment for health care by the
community members. This definition would exclude financing schemes such as regional
compulsory social insurance plans and community-managed user fee programs." (Hsiao,
2001)11
"The term "community-based health insurance" is used in this study to refer to any non-
profit health financing scheme. It covers any not-for-profit insurance scheme that is aimed
primarily at the informal sector and formed on the basis of an ethic of mutual aid and the
collective pooling of health risks, and in which the members participate in its
management." (Musau, 1999)12
"Community financing is an umbrella term used for several different resource mobilisation
instruments.The instruments vary in the extent of their prepayment and risk sharing, in
their resource allocation mechanisms, organisational and institutional characteristics. Never
the less, the common features they share include the predominate role of the community
in mobilising, pooling and allocating resources, solidarity mechanisms, poor beneficiary
population, and voluntary participation." (Jakab and Krishnan, 2001)9
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Figure 1. Type I and Type II schemes: two ends of a risksharing spectrum
Figure 1 is adapted from: Creese A, Bennett S. 1997.15 
There are many typologies seeking to classify schemes for the purposes of evaluating
them. Bennett et al have developed a typology (Figure 1) that classifies schemes as
either Type I or Type II schemes – depending on the services that CBHF schemes cover
– which is useful for understanding the existing schemes in Armenia, and for
considering future options for their scaling up.8 Type I schemes are defined as those
covering high cost, low frequency events (hospital admissions for major illness
episodes); they provide significant protection against catastrophic health care
expenditure. Type II schemes are defined as those covering low cost, high frequency
events (preventative care, immunisation, family planning, maternal and child health
and other primary health care services); they provide much less protection against
catastrophic health care expenditure (some protection is achieved via prevention and
less frequent need for hospital care), but they maximise the health impact of schemes
because they concentrate resources in the areas of preventative services and primary
health care. These schemes represent two ends of a risk-sharing spectrum. Figure 1
summarises key characteristics of the main types of CBHF within this typology.
The Cover and Risk-Sharing Spectrum 
Type I Schemes 
• Cover: high cost, low frequency care 
(hospital services for major illnesses) 
• Significant protection against catastrophic 
health expenditure; focus on risk sharing; 
more risk pooling 
• Less impact on health outcomes 
• More at risk from adverse selection and 
moral hazard 
• More administratively complex; premiums 
set on an actuarial basis; more committed to 
cost recovery especially for variable costs 
• Tend to be hospital-owned and cover a large 
geographic area; community solidarity less 
important 
Type II Schemes 
• Cover: low cost, high frequency care 
(preventative and PHC services) 
• Little protection against catastrophic health 
expenditure; focus on improving quality of 
care and extending access to under-served 
communities; less risk pooling 
• Higher impact on health outcomes 
• Moral hazard and adverse selection are less 
of a risk 
• Less administratively complex; premiums 
set according to ability to pay; aim to raise 
extra revenue rather than achieving cost 
recovery
• Tend to be community-owned, based at the 
village level, and concerned with 
community development; community 
solidarity important
The evolution of CBHI as a response to the health sector financing gap
There are significant constraints on governments’ abilities to raise resources via
taxation in much of the developing world. In low-income countries, income from
taxation is an average 14% of GNP compared to 31% in high-income countries, and per
capita GNPs are lower.16 As a result there are insufficient resources to spend on public
services and governments are unable to finance essential health care. The estimates of
the sise of this health sector financing gap range from 25–50 billion US$,17 to over 100
billion US$.
In the mid-1980s the World Bank promoted user fees as a financing mechanism to
bridge the health sector financing gap.3,18 Another development was the Bamako
Initiative,i which in 1987 advocated cost recovery for basic drugs to sustain the resources
at the primary health care level, with the process managed by the communities
themselves. However, there is a growing consensus that the widespread introduction of
user fees has had disappointing results. User fees have been ineffective as a revenue-
raising tool for the public health system, raising an average of 5% of total recurrent
health system expenditure, compared to the 15–20% that the World Bank had
expected.3 There is little evidence that user fees have led to hoped-for efficiency
gains;19,20 on the contrary, there is evidence that they can create perverse incentives that
decrease efficiency.21,22 User fees have also often had negative equity impacts despite
attempts to introduce exemption mechanisms to cushion their effect on the poor.23,24,25,26,27
Targeting public subsidies at the poor to mitigate against the effects of user fees has often
benefited the rich more than the poor.13,28,29,30 Furthermore, because user fees require
expenditure at the point of use, they exclude those who are unable to raise resources
from accessing the care they need.23,25,26,31,32,33
An increasing reliance on user fees and tolerance of informal payments has resulted
in out-of-pocket expenditure becoming a significant proportion of total health
expenditure in many middle- and low-income countries. For example, in Argentina,
Mexico, Columbia and Thailand, between 40–45% of total health expenditure is from
out-of-pocket payments. In 60% of countries with per capita incomes below $1,000, out-
of-pocket expenditure accounts for more than 40% of total health expenditure.2 There
is a strong correlation between the proportion of total health expenditure covered by
out-of-pocket expenditure and the incidence of catastrophic health expenditure.34
Catastrophic health expenditure – which occurs when a household’s health care
expenditure exceeds 40% of their income after subsistence needs have been met – can
tip individuals and families into long-term poverty because it is funded via borrowing or
selling productive assets.
Catastrophic expenditure is a consequence of the fact that user fees as a financing
mechanism do not allow for pooling of resources or sharing of risk; the cost of an episode
of care is borne entirely by the individual and their family.2 Risk sharing or risk pooling
can be defined as the reduction or “elimination of the uncertain risk of loss for the individual
or household by combining a larger number of similarly exposed individuals or households into
a common fund that makes good the loss caused to any one member”.35 Decreasing
catastrophic health expenditure requires the introduction of financing mechanisms that
enable risk sharing. 
III.The literature review of CBHI        21
i The Bamako Initiative (BI) was launched by African Ministers of Health in 1987 with support from UNICEF and WHO.The
aim of the BI was to generate resources for PHC, and in particular child and maternal health, via the introduction of user fees
and pharmaceutical cost-recovery schemes (utilising a revolving drug fund model). Under the BI, such income was supposed
to provide resources to improve the quality of services and address equity concerns.
Tax-funded health systems, or systems funded via compulsory social health insurance
achieve the high levels of risk pooling; they are able to provide services accessible to all
on the basis of need and eliminate catastrophic health expenditure.1 However, it has
proved difficult to institute such health financing mechanisms in low-income countries.
Taxation-based health financing has failed to be effective because of weak economies,
large informal sectors (which are difficult to tax), as well as inadequate institutional and
organisational capacity; the same constraints, with the additional burden of
administrative complexity, make compulsory social health insurance difficult to
implement too.36,37,38,39
Pooling mechanisms in low-income countries are generally weak, and high out-of-
pocket health expenditure undermines what pooling mechanisms there are;13,40 the poor
in such countries are largely excluded from formal risk-sharing arrangements. As a result
they have no financial protection against the costs of illness or they are unable to access
health care.41 This failure is now widely recognised and in light of the siseable body of
evidence relating to the adverse impacts of user fees, there is a developing international
consensus that user fees should not be charged for essential services. A good illustration
of this is the World Bank’s revised stance on user fees:
“The World Bank does not support user fees for primary education and basic health services
for poor people. Access to these basic services is vital to improving the welfare of the poor in
developing countries. …The Bank supports the provision of free basic health services to poor
people.”42
As the result of a number of recent global initiatives – the Millennium Summit
(2000) and its associated health-related Millennium Development Goals,43 the
Commission on Macroeconomics and Health (2001),16 and the Commission for Africa
(2005)44 – there is increasing interest in alternative mechanisms of health financing that
ensure fairness in financial contributions while improving financial protection against
the cost of illness for the poor and increasing their access to essential health
services.2,45,46,47
“With growing recognition of central governments’ limited ability to finance and manage 
health care, new forms of finance and, perhaps more important, new forms of organisation
are being introduced. In low-income countries with poor growth and large informal sectors,
a major goal of health reform is to find new ways to organise accessible care of good quality,
using a maximum of nongovernmental resources in a transparent manner.”15
Community-based financing mechanisms, which “have evolved in settings with severe
economic constraints, political instability, lack of good public sector governance, and
impoverishing out-of-pocket user charges” are seen by many governments, donors and
NGOs as one financing mechanism that could be useful in such environments to
increase risk pooling and access to care.48,49,50,51 They are increasingly popular because
community financing schemes such as community-based health insurance (which allows
for risk pooling), or pre-payment schemes (which spread out the cost of health-related
expenditure over time), provide some protection from the impoverishing effects of
unpredictable expenditure due to illness.4
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Community health financing schemes are becoming common in countries where
public expenditure on health is less than 50% of total health expenditure.52 However,
such schemes, while useful, are increasingly recognised as an intermediate response to
expanding risk protection to the entire population.52 Community health financing
schemes are only the first step away from reliance on out-of-pocket financing towards
achieving the ultimate goal of universal insurance coverage through some mix of tax-
based financing, (compulsory) social health insurance and private health insurance.
The role the CBHI can play in realising a gradual expansion of risk protection over
time as more and more people are covered by larger and larger risk pools is illustrated
below in Figure 2. It also highlights the supportive donor and government policies that
are needed to facilitate different stages of this evolution. At the lower levels of the “risk
pooling” hierarchy you have little risk pooling (when health is financed predominately
via out-of-pocket payments), while at the top you have maximum risk pooling (when
health is financed via universal insurance coverage). Although it is not clear in this
figure, social health insurance is not the only option for extending universal protection
against the cost of illness (universal “insurance” coverage); universal “insurance”
coverage can be achieved via some mixture of tax-financed health care, social health
insurance, and private health insurance.
Figure 2. Stages of financial protection and supporting policies
Figure 2 is adapted from: Arhin-Tenkorang D. 2001. HNP Discussion Paper. Health Insurance for
the Informal Sector in Africa. Design Features, Risk, Protection, and Resource Mobilisation. World
Bank, Washington DC.
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The strengths and weaknesses of CBHF
There is now a large literature on the strengths and weaknesses of CBHF, the key
points of which are outlined below and summarised in Box 2. There is no contemporary
evidence on the impact of CBHF schemes on the health status of their members,
although this is not surprising given the methodological challenges of evaluating
impact.5,8,53 However, Hsiao suggests that the Cooperative Medical System (CMS)
schemes in China, which were a form of voluntary community-based health insurance,
had a significant impact on the health status of members via contributing significantly
to China’s “first health care revolution”.11 In rural areas, infant mortality was reduced from
200/1000 live births (1949) to 47/1000 (1973–75), and life expectancy almost doubled,
from 35 to 65 years.54 Since the collapse of the CMS, the health status of China’s rural
population has deteriorated.11
There is significant evidence that CBHF schemes make a positive contribution to
raising revenue,9,22,50,55,56,57,58,59 although the amount raised is variable and significantly
constrained by low participation rates and the low incomes of the contributing
populations.8,11,50,60,61 With average cost-recovery of schemes at around 30%,8 it is clear
that community financing mechanisms can mobilise significant resources for health care
in low-income settings. Furthermore, the involvement of the community – in various
forms – allows tapping into more household resources than would be otherwise available
for health care.9 However, it is important to stress that all schemes depended on
continuing external subsidies to remain viable; CBHI is not a viable option for fully
funding primary health care in low-income countries.
Many authors have reported that the increased resources that CBHF schemes
mobilise can improve access to drugs and primary health care, with some schemes
increasing access to hospital-based care.11,50,56,58,62,63,64,65 Furthermore, Ekman – in a
systematic review of the evidence on CBHF – concluded that community-based schemes
(as opposed to provider-based schemes) appear to be more successful in improving access
to care.6 However, while schemes increase access for their members, authors caution that
CBHF schemes are not able to reduce the financial access barriers to the poorest.22,66,67
Community-based health financing schemes reduce the out-of-pocket expenditure of
their members, with improved financial protection as a result.9,50,51,59,60,64,68 A number of
authors have concluded that schemes can achieve significant levels of risk pooling,ii  and
protect against catastrophic health expenditure.8,50,51 However, the financial protection
provided will be dependent on the scope of services covered by an individual scheme –
if hospital care is not covered, financial protection will be decreased. Furthermore,
because most members are poor, there is little scope for redistribution from rich to
poor.8,9,11 Risk pooling is also limited because schemes are small, the better off choose not
to join, and most schemes face substantial adverse selection problems.iii This is
particularly likely if specific measures to counter adverse selection, such as membership
on a family basis, are not incorporated into a scheme’s design. The impact of the schemes
in terms of risk protection is further undermined because of low average coverage
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ii In health insurance, risk pooling refers to a process where people contribute money to a common fund
which can then be used to cover the health care expenses of any members. People who do not use health
services effectively subsidise those who do.To be effective and ensure cross subsidy, risk pools need to include
the sick and the well, the employed and the unproductive, the young and the old, the poor and the wealthy.
The larger the number of members, the more effective the protection of the vulnerable is.
iiiAdverse selection refers to individuals who are more likely to utilise health services (the old, people with
chronic diseases etc.) having a greater incentive to join schemes because they benefit from them.This increases
the cost per member, which may require premiums to be increased, and escalate costs.
rates,5,54,57 and the failure of most schemes to cover the least well off.8,69 Despite these
limitations, there is a developing consensus that community financing mechanisms have
a useful role to play in increasing financial protection:
“Community financing through prepayment and risk sharing reduces financial barriers to 
care, as demonstrated by higher utilisation but lower out-of-pocket expenditure of scheme 
members… These findings confirm that risk pooling and prepayment, no matter how small
scale, improve financial protection for the populations that they serve. The policy implication
of this finding is that it is critical to move away from resource-mobilisation instruments that
are based on point-of-service payments. If prepayment and risk sharing can be encouraged,
it is likely to have an immediate impact on poverty – directly via having an impact on 
impoverishment through reducing catastrophic health expenditures, or indirectly, by ensuring
access to health care, thereby improving health and allowing individuals to take advantage of
economic and social opportunities.” (Jakab et al, 2004)70
In terms of equity there is considerable evidence that CBHI can reach a large number
of people from low-income populations who would otherwise have no protection against
the costs of illness.9,11,51,56,59,68,71,72,73 As a result, CBHI can have positive equity outcomes.59
However, the generally low coverage by voluntary schemes of their target populations
decreases their positive equity impact, as does the fact that the cost of such schemes can
still be a barrier to the poorest.8,51,59,67,69,70,74,75,76 Geographical access barriers can also
undermine equity; people further away from health facilities are less likely to join
schemes and those that do have lower utilisation rates.11,59,64,76,77,78 However, with
appropriate scheme design – including strong participatory processes, targeted subsidies,
facilitation of contribution payments, ensuring that services are delivered at facilities
close to where people live, and effective information campaigns – the poorest can be
included and geographical access barriers minimised.70
The administrative cost of well-designed schemes can be reasonable (5–10% of total
expenditure).10 The major factors that determine the administrative cost of running
schemes relate to the complexity of the schemes and the effectiveness of management
structures. As Bennett et al note:
“All CBHF schemes require a number of supporting administrative and operational systems
such as identification systems for scheme members, membership data bases, and financial 
management systems; the better designed these systems are, the lower administrative costs 
will ultimately be.” (Bennett et al, 2004)10
However, many CBHF schemes rely on volunteer labour, which is not factored into
estimates of administrative costs. Such volunteer input may be difficult to sustain as
schemes are scaled up, which could increase the cost of running them. On the other
hand, as CBHF is scaled up, schemes tend to become larger, and this can allow for
economies of scale to be achieved.10
CBHF can result in better allocation of resources, ensuring access to services and
drugs that meet communities’ needs.22,54,56 Hsiao cited the Cooperative Medical System
(CMS) schemes in China and the Dana Sehat schemes in Indonesia as examples of
this,54 and the introduction of CBHI in Rwanda improved the efficient use of resources
including drugs and staff.59 In contrast, Ekman found no evidence that CBHI improved
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efficiency,6 and others suggest that technical efficiency can be undermined by a failure
to define cost-effective packages of care or introduce effective purchasing mechanisms,5,8
as well as unnecessary use of services due to consumer or provider moral hazard.iv
Bennett et al noted that the purchasing functions of community health financing
schemes tended to be weak,8 and the ILO review also concluded that few conducted
strategic purchasing.5
A number of authors have identified moral hazard problems as a significant issue that
undermines financial sustainability.66,77,79,80 Moral hazard problems were particularly
marked for schemes covering hospital services and where provider remuneration was on
a fee-for-service basis.66,77,79,80 However, Ekman could find no evidence that the schemes
he examined were subject to moral hazard problems. Barnighausen and Sauerborn
concluded that the German experience suggests costs can be successfully contained in a
fee-for-service system – which is useful for providing incentives for priority services – if
provider moral hazard is controlled via political pressure and technical mechanisms.
However, other authors suggest that in Germany both provider and consumer moral
hazard remains a problem.81,82
Introducing mechanisms to control adverse selection is vital to ensure both control
of costs and adequate risk pooling. This could be achieved through enrolment on a
family basis and compulsory membership. As community-based health insurance
schemes are expanded, managing financial instability becomes more important.
Mechanisms to address this include: combining small schemes and introducing
compulsory membership to increase cross-subsidisation between members (Korea,
Taiwan, Japan, Germany); government underwriting; and re-insurance.
Key mechanisms for realising such efficiency gains include incorporation of high-
priority cost-effective services in the benefit package, and more efficient utilisation of
staff. There is evidence that improving drug procurement and distribution mechanisms
can result in cost savings of 40–60% and improve drug availability.83,84,85 Strategies for
better procurement and prescribing include: the use of essential drug lists to guide
prescribing and procurement, which requires harmonisation with government policy;
procurement via competitive tendering; improved storage and distribution; and the
introduction of security systems to reduce theft.86 Implementation of these strategies
with scaling up CBHI would be useful from an efficiency perspective, and would require
integration of schemes with the broader health system in a manner that ensures
transparency and fairness in the procurement process to prevent corruption.87
iv Moral hazard refers to the overuse of services by patients (consumer moral hazard) or the overuse of
diagnostic and treatment options by health professionals (provider moral hazard) that results because a third
party is covering the cost of services (the community financing scheme in this case).
Box 2. Strengths and weaknesses of CBHF: the international consensus
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• There are no recent evaluations of the impact of CBHF on the health status of 
scheme members; the Cooperative Medical System in China provides a historical
example of CBHF contributing significantly to lower infant mortality and 
increasing life expectancy.
• Well-designed CBHF schemes increase access to care and drugs that meet 
communities’ needs, and can be effective in reaching low-income populations 
who would otherwise have no protection against the costs of illness.The poorest
an still be excluded, especially in the absence of significant subsidies.
• Administrative cost can be reasonable (5–10% of total expenditure); CBHF can 
result in better allocation of resources and increased efficiency.
• CBHF schemes can help to improve the quality of care.
• CBHF can contribute to raising revenue in low-income settings, but are 
constrained by the low incomes of their members. Schemes require external 
subsidies to be sustainable.
• CBHF schemes reduce the out-of-pocket expenditure of their members while 
increasing their utilisation of health care services, with improved financial 
protection as a result.
• Most schemes encounter adverse selection, which can significantly undermine 
schemes’ abilities to pool risk and limits the scope for redistribution from the 
healthy to the sick.
• Schemes tend to have population coverage rates of around 30%, with small risk 
pools. Since most CBHI members are poor, there is little scope for redistribution
from rich to poor.
• CBHI schemes can enable communities to have a voice in health policy and 
advocacy.
• Popular participation in scheme management makes the schemes more 
accountable and responsive to the needs of the communities that they serve, and
counters corruption.
Scaling up CBHF and integrating it with the broader health system
There is increasing international interest in scaling up CBHF mechanisms to improve
access to health care and increase financial protection against the cost of illness. This
section presents evidence from high- and low-income countries on the long-term
contributions community financing has made to key health policy objectives, including
increasing population coverage, financial protection, equity, efficiency and quality of
care. The importance of good governance, government stewardship and social capital in
this process is also discussed. There is a developing consensus on the scheme
characteristics that are essential for success, and the constraints to scaling up. The
constraints are related to: the political, social and cultural context within which CBHF
schemes operate; generic problems with insurance; scheme design and management
problems; and a lack of integration with the broader health care system (Table 1).
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Table 1. Characteristics for success in scaling up and integration of CBHI
Scheme 
characteristics
Technical 
design
characteristics
Management
characteristics
Organisational
characteristics
Institutional
characteristics
Features supporting high participation rates,
effective revenue collection and financial
protection
• Addressing adverse selection (group 
membership;capitation-based 
payments and salaried remuneration 
for providers, compulsory 
membership).
• Widening risk pools protects against 
financial instability (combining small 
schemes; reinsurance; government or 
donor underwriting).
• Mechanisms to address provider 
moral hazard and fraud.
• Designing contribution schedules to 
accommodate irregular income.
• Subsidies for the poor of 50–100%.
• Participation depends on: good scope 
and quality of care; geographical 
proximity; minimal co-payments;
effective marketing; high levels of 
social capital.
• Community involvement in 
management is central to trust and 
accountability.
• Capacity building at the managerial 
level; regional support structures.
• Adequate health information systems 
to inform decision making and quality 
control.
• Increasing management capacity is 
essential to sustainability during 
scaling up.
• Linkages with providers enable the 
negotiation of preferential rates.
• Integration within broader health 
system increases quality and the 
scope of services.
• Links to broader development 
initiatives strengthens CBHF schemes.
• Sustained government and donor 
subsidies and support improves the 
sustainability and pro-poor orientation 
of the schemes.
• Effective government action in:
defining policy objectives; developing 
a legal framework; developing 
guidelines and formal accreditation 
processes; legislating for compulsory 
membership.
• Scheme evolution over time to adapt 
to a changing context.
Features undermining high participation,
revenue collection and financial 
protection
• Non-compliance, evasion of 
membership payments.
• Adverse selection.
• Small risk pools.
• Moral hazard and fraud.
• Cash-poor local economies.
• No cash income at the time 
contributions are due.
• Low quality of care; geographical 
access barriers; high co-payments;
poor marketing.
• A lack of subsidies for the poor.
• A failure to address key determinants 
of participation.
• Provider capture of scheme 
management leading to increased pay 
for providers at the expense of 
improvements in service quality.
• Weak supervision structures negatively
affect quality of care and increase 
opportunities for fraud and corruption.
• Poor control over providers and 
members contributes to moral hazard,
cost escalation, and undermines 
sustainability.
• Weak linkages with providers.
• Poor integration within broader health 
system and fragmentation between 
inpatient and outpatient care leads to 
inefficiency and waste.
• Failure to embed CBHF in 
development initiatives.
• A lack of government support and 
financial subsidies leads to scheme 
failure.
• Lack of clearly defined policy 
objectives; inadequate legal 
frameworks; and a lack of guidelines.
• Failure to institutionalise flexibility.
Table 1 is adapted from: Jakab M, Krishnan C. 2001. Community Involvement in Health Care Financing. A
Survey of the Literature on the Impacts, Strengths, and Weaknesses. Commission on Macroeconomics and
Health WG3 Paper 9.
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Analytical frameworks for scaling up CBHF
Conceptually, expansion of CBHF schemes needs to be considered in two
dimensions. First, expansion can occur in terms of the scope of service covered. This is
called vertical expansion and usually requires integration with the broader health system
to allow access to more services (although in theory CBHF schemes could expand to
become a parallel health system). A number of issues must be dealt with if integration is
to be successful: referral mechanisms (gate keeping, shared care arrangements, specialist
outpatient clinics in primary care facilities); financing issues (who pays for what
elements of service delivery, and where the money is to come from); integrating health
information systems; management structures; support and supervision; and monitoring
and accountability. Second, there is horisontal expansion to increase population
coverage. Horisontal expansion requires increasing the geographical coverage of the
schemes to include more population centres or extending coverage to new population
groups. One potential benefit of horisontal expansion is economies of scale (e.g. the
potential to realise savings via shared procurement of generic drugs via an international
contracting process, the spreading of fixed costs etc.). Another benefit is the potential
to increase risk-pooling, which contributes to the financial stability of schemes, enables
greater cross-subsidy and increases the extent of the financial protection that can be
achieved. This is especially true if the schemes are made compulsory or can be expanded
to cover costs associated with hospital care.
Analytical frameworks have been developed to guide decision making when
considering the feasibility of scaling up community insurance or introducing social
health insurance.88,89,90,91 Van Ginnekin (2003) points out that prior to a move towards
compulsory health insurance, policy makers should examine the socio-economic,
political and socio-cultural situation, as well as the health sector’s capacity, particularly
human resource constraints. The level of political commitment to support national
schemes and the relative sise of the informally employed and rural populations – which
are difficult to include in insurance schemes – are also important. Ranson and Bennett’s
framework outlines the strategies governments can adopt to improve the efficiency,
impact and sustainability of schemes, such as: forging a consensus on the health policy
objectives to which community financing would contribute; overcoming environmental
constraints; addressing the generic problems with insurance; and critically assessing
scheme design and management structures and the potential for integration with the
broader health care system.89
While there is a growing literature on scheme design and implementation,8,13 little
attention has been paid to the process of deciding whether or not to scale up community
financing models in the first place. Indeed, the desirability of an expanded insurance
model as a tool to increase coverage, vis-à-vis taxation, has been taken for granted.
However, a framework developed by Normand and Weber – which was originally
developed for scaling up social insurance – highlights key issues that need to be
addressed when the scale up of CBHI is being considered. In particular, it highlights the
need to consider the appropriateness and feasibility of CBHI given the local context.90 It
outlines three phases: a decision making phase, a design phase, and an implementation
phase (Figure 3).
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Figure 3. Scaling up community insurance: key steps in decision making
Decision Making Phase
• Does community insurance fit with health policy objectives?
• Does community insurance fit with reform strategies?
• Assessing desirability of scaling up community insurance
o Equity and sustainability considerations 
o Efficiency
o Considerations related to quality of care 
• Assessing feasibility of scaling up community-based insurance
o Administrative constraints
o Compatibility with provider payment mechanisms
o Feasibility of increasing service delivery at peripheral levels
o Integrating community financing  with the broader health system
o Compatibility with values, expectation and social capital
o Feasibility of increasing the benefits package and contributions 
o Political feasibility
Design Phase
• Population coverage - the target population to be covered initially
• Voluntary or compulsory membership
• Scope of benefits packages given the expected resource constraints
• Management arrangements 
• Provider payment mechanisms to ensure appropriate incentives 
• Cost control mechanisms: discouraging overuse
Implementation Phase
• Communication and consensus building
• Drafting enabling legislation
• Phased introduction with monitoring and evaluation to ensure that 
lessons learned from pilot schemes can be incorporated subsequently
Figure 3 is adapted from Normand & Weber.90
Expanding coverage – a gradual process facilitated by growth
There are examples of countries that have overcome these constraints. The growth
and consolidation of small-scale community financing schemes made a significant
contribution to the introduction of national social health insurance schemes in
Germany and Japan. 
The Jyorei schemes in Japan began as village-level voluntary health insurance
schemes for low-income rural populations. Their scaling up was facilitated by the
government via the development of a legal framework within which the schemes
operated, as well as the definition of policy objectives for the national-level schemes
into which they were incorporated. Between 1934 and 1935, the government piloted
community-based health insurance programmes based on the Jyorei system. These
became the basis for the National Citisen’s Health Insurance Fund (NCHIF), which still
covers 34% of the population;92 in combination with other insurance schemes, it has
enabled the Japanese to extend universal health insurance cover to their population. A
law detailing the legal framework for the NCHIF was passed in 1938, and the NCHIF
eventually incorporated the existing Medical Cooperative Societies (which the Jyorei
had already been integrated with). The final step to ensuring universal coverage was the
introduction of legislation for mandatory health insurance in 1961.
In Germany, small voluntary health insurance schemes – the relief funds that
developed as mutual support systems in the medieval craft-based guild system – laid the
foundations for the rapid expansion of insurance coverage in the 19th century.93 This
process led directly to the development of a national health insurance system which has
proved to be successful in terms of raising revenue and in providing universal access to
health care.93,94,95 Again the process was driven by the government via the promulgation
of a series of laws that moved progressively from defining general principles to concrete
rules, gradually introduced more compulsion, and expanded their remit from a local level
to regional and eventually supra-regional level. Finally, in 1883 Bismark legislated to
introduce the first compulsory national insurance scheme for workers in formal
employment. Over time, compulsory insurance cover expanded incrementally until
universal coverage was achieved around 1960; this expansion included both increased
population coverage, and increased scope of services.93,94
The Jyorei schemes facilitated the introduction of national insurance mechanisms
through developing technical and management expertise, and enhancing population
familiarity and demand for insurance coverage. The Jyorei provided a successful working
model that subsequent insurance schemes were able to build on. A similar experience
has been documented in Germany.93,94,95
The significant expansion of community financing in Germany and Japan – as part of
a drive to introduce national insurance mechanisms – occurred during periods of
significant economic growth. This is also true for Korea, which averaged 6.1% growth
from 1975–2002.96,97 As incomes increased, contributions became more affordable, and
the government was able to collect sufficient tax revenue to subsidise health insurance
for the informal and agricultural sectors.
While extension of insurance to the formal sector in Korea was relatively easy – a
phenomenon observed in Germany and Japan too – attempts to extend compulsory
coverage to the informal and agricultural sectors, and integrate such schemes nationally,
were problematic.97 Farmers resisted such moves and the government adopted a number
of strategies to encourage their participation, including: lower contribution rates based
III.The literature review of CBHI         31
32 Options for scaling up community-based health insurance for rural communities in Armenia
on income rather than assets; higher subsidies (50% compared to 33% for urban
participants); and investment in infrastructure and human resources to improve the
quality of services and overcome supply-side constraints. All of these strategies depended
on the increased resources available as a result of economic growth.
The Cooperative Medical System (CMS) in China is another example where scaling
up CBHI was significant in expanding coverage.98 The system consisted of rural
insurance schemes providing primary care that were well integrated with higher levels
of care.  At its peak, it achieved a coverage of over 90% of China’s estimated 800 million
rural population.8,54,99,100,101
Thailand has achieved progress towards universal financial protection via
incorporating a number of different financing mechanisms into the national health
financing policy framework.102 The mechanisms include the Thai health card, a form of
CBHI that is heavily subsidised by the government and targeted at the poor. It now
covers around 3 million people reliant on farming and informal income.54 Other
mechanisms include insurance schemes for government workers as well as earmarked
tax-based funding to cover the cost of care for the elderly and children. Scaling up of the
health card scheme (in terms of participation, geographical coverage and the scope of
benefits) has been accompanied by increasing integration with the wider health system.
Taken together, the different health financing measures have led to coverage against the
cost of illness for an increasing proportion of the population. However, a significant
proportion of the population remains without insurance cover or access to publicly
funded care (28% of the population in 1995).103
Vietnam provides another example of CBHI as one component of a pluralistic health
financing system. It has experienced limited success with using voluntary community-
based health insurance schemes, targeted at the 90% of the population that is not
covered by the compulsory insurance arrangements for large enterprises and civil
servants. Again this has occurred as part of a drive to achieve national insurance
coverage. However, the coverage achieved to date has been disappointing; by the end of
1997, the percentage of the population insured under the schemes was 5.5%, although
this represented 4 million out of a potential 38 million eligible to join.73
Countries have followed a strategy of gradual expansion of voluntary CBHF schemes
for the informal sector and compulsory health insurance for the formal sector. Over time,
schemes are expanded to other groups or merged into larger health insurance funds.
However, economic development and political stewardship remain a prerequisite for the
extension of health insurance to the entire population.
Equity and protection for the poor – the need for subsidies and larger risk pools
From an equity perspective, securing subsides aimed at lowering the cost of
membership for the poorest people is crucial. Hsiao concluded that the subsidies need to
be of the order of 50–100% of the cost of membership.54 Even with heavily subsidised
premiums, other barriers will remain that should be addressed to ensure positive equity
outcomes. In particular, the cost of transport, hotel expenses (food and other expenses
incurred during a hospital stay), opportunity costs and geographical access barriers may
prevent the poorest from accessing care, even if it is free at point of use.104,105,106,107
Additional targeting to address these barriers is needed. However, the literature on user
fees suggests that targeting mechanisms often fail to benefit the poor, which suggests that
targeting mechanisms for CBHI need to be carefully designed.20,108
More recently, new approaches have been pioneered for targeting subsidies – such as
proxy means testing, conditional cash transfers, and health equity funds – that are
demonstrably pro-poor.107,109,110 Some of these approaches could be usefully incorporated
into CBHI schemes. For example, health equity funds have proven useful in overcoming
the financial barriers to care that remain even if access is free at point of use, as
experience in Cambodia demonstrates.107 However, to date the evidence base on
effective mechanisms for ensuring pro-poor health outcomes is weak. For this reason,
ongoing monitoring and evaluation of the equity impacts of CBHI linked to flexible
programmatic adaptation will be essential if equity issues are to be addressed as CBHI is
scaled up.109,110
In Vietnam, in response to recommendations from a collaboration between the WHO
and the Vietnamese Health Insurance Agency, inter-provincial risk-sharing is now
possible following approval for the redistribution of funds between provinces. This
provides schemes in poorer provinces with a cross-subsidy and is a way of increasing the
degree of risk pooling.73 This policy is explicitly designed to increase equity between regions.
In Thailand, the government provides a matching subsidy – which effectively
integrates the health card scheme with public health financing mechanisms – so that
individuals purchasing cards only pay 50% of the cost. Additional unintended cross-
subsidy occurs in Thailand due to the fact that budgetary allocations from the Health
Card Funds are insufficient to cover the cost of the services provided at public health
facilities. The result of this is that the public providers effectively subsidise the provision
of services for cardholders; however, as a result practitioners have a disincentive to treat
health card holders and provide them with inferior quality care. None of these subsidies
would have been possible if Thailand had not experienced sustained economic growth,
averaging 5.1% from 1975–2003.111
The German experience illustrates the importance of merging individual funds as
insurance mechanisms are scaled up to expand the sise of risk pools. This can be
beneficial from an equity perspective because it increases the potential for cross-subsidy.
However, if there is competition between insurance funds, they have an incentive to
exclude high-risk/high-cost patients (which conflicts with health system equity goals).
Mechanisms such as risk-equalisation schemes mandated by the government need to be
introduced to ensure the health insurance is socially inclusive.
According to Bennett, the equity impact of community financing schemes should be
assessed not only at the scheme level but also at a system-wide level.112 Even if
community health financing schemes are equitable per se, they may not contribute to
increased overall equity within health systems; if they capture subsidies that had
previously been targeted at the most disadvantaged – who often cannot afford to join the
schemes – the poorest people may become worse off, with decreased access and increased
risk of catastrophic expenditure. 
New problems can be created by the way the schemes are linked to the broader health
system. In Vietnam for example, CBHI schemes purchase outpatient care from public
hospitals, but not from commune health facilities (which are close to where people live)
or from the private sector (where care is perceived to be of better quality). This probably
has a negative equity impact on poor rural people and contributes to low participation
rates; it makes the schemes less attractive to join because the care covered is perceived
to be of inferior quality, and it increases travel and opportunity costs.73 A similar problem
has been identified in Thailand, where again the Thai health card entitles people to care
only in designated public facilities.
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Increasing the scope and quality of service
Integration between different levels of clinical service delivery can significantly
strengthen schemes and facilitate an increase in the quality and scope of services
covered. This is achieved via avoiding unnecessary duplication of services, which
increases efficiency. Improving the scope and quality of care motivates people to join the
schemes and use services. Schemes can also contribute to increasing the quality of care
via purchasing mechanisms such as contracts that stipulate performance-related
requirements, although many schemes fail to use such mechanisms effectively.8,54 Ekman,
however, concluded that there is weak evidence that CBHI schemes have an effect on
quality of care.6
The Jyorei schemes in Japan provide an example where scaling up and integration
increased the scope of services that members of community health financing schemes
were able to access.92 Hsiao cites the Cooperative Medical System (CMS) schemes in
China and the Dana Sehat schemes in Indonesia as examples of community health
financing schemes that have produced measurable gains in service quality. The
integration of different levels of care in the cooperative medical system of China prior
to the 1980s enabled members to access a broad range of services, from PHC at the
village level to five basic specialty services at the county hospitals.54 The collapse of the
CMS had a significant negative impact on the scope of care accessible in rural areas, due
to the loss of supervision and training previously provided by higher levels of care and
the weakening of the government’s monitoring and regulation of the rural health
system.54,113,114
According to Barnighausen and Sauerborn, Germany’s experience demonstrates that
a trade off has to be made between the scope of services that CBHI offers and
affordability. They suggest that the benefit package should be adapted incrementally in
light of both the population’s health needs and their economic circumstances. This is
important to ensure that schemes are financially sustainable.93
Failure to include the private sector can undermine quality of care. In Thailand,
under the health card scheme care is provided on a capitation basis only at public health
facilities. However, the poor quality of care in the public health system has been
identified as one disincentive to buying health cards, and some scheme members elect
to seek care in the private sector even though they are entitled to free access at public
facilities. In Vietnam, membership of the voluntary CBHI schemes also only entitles
members to access services via the state system, where the quality of services is low.
Jowett et al found that the insured received poorer quality of care in terms of longer
waiting times and poor customer service, when compared to users who paid out-of-
pocket.73 Many people prefer to pay for care in the private sector, including people who
are enrolled in the insurance schemes. The schemes also only allow access to hospital-
based inpatient and outpatient treatment, and this makes the schemes less attractive
since easily accessible PHC services at commune health centres have to be paid for. In
Rwanda, the government-initiated community-based schemes have failed to build stable
partnership and referral systems with mission hospitals, reducing access to providers that
are widely perceived to be delivering good quality care. 
Service quality (relative to other treatment options) has an impact on participation
in voluntary schemes, as the Thai experience shows, while experience in China,
Thailand, Vietnam, Indonesia and Korea all point to affordability being a major
constraint. The extent to which services are provided locally is another key factor
(China, Thailand). High co-payments and informal user fees make schemes less
attractive to join. The effectiveness of communication strategies is also important as the
benefits of voluntary CBHF schemes need to be marketed.
The importance of social capital
Social capital – a measure of how much people within a society are willing and able
to help each other – is regarded as an important determinant of individuals’ willingness
to pay for CBHI (along with expected economic and quality gains);54 willingness to pay
in turn is a key determinant of whether or not a CBHI scheme is feasible and sustainable.
A recent World Bank study in China demonstrated that there is a significant
relationship between social capital, willingness to pay for CBHI, and actual enrolment
in such schemes.115 Findings from five household surveys carried out for the Commission
for Macroeconomics and Health also provide evidence to support the importance of
social capital.7 In addition, Hsiao has concluded that social factors influence people’s
decision to join CBHI schemes.11,54
Social capital can be operationalised in four dimensions: links within communities;
links between communities; links between different institutions; and links between
governments and their citisens. High levels of social capital within communities have
assisted in the setting up of CBHI schemes. However, low levels of social capital in the
other dimensions (weak links between different communities, weak institutional links
and weak links between governments and their citisens) may make it difficult to scale
up CBHI schemes and increase the sise of risk pools via merging schemes. Put simply,
people may be happy to subsidise their neighbour, but not happy to subsidise people in
another village; people may trust local community representatives to carry out the
governance role of a CBHI scheme, but not trust regional or national "community"
representatives to do so; people may not trust the government and feel uncomfortable at
giving government representatives any role in CBHI schemes at all. In this sense, social
capital issues can be seen as one of the constraints on scaling up CBHI schemes.
The importance of government stewardship
Political stewardship is also important in expanding the coverage of community
schemes. In the examples of Japan and Germany described above, government action
was needed to expand and consolidate community financing schemes and integrate
them with the broader health financing system. This role included enacting supportive
legislative and regulatory frameworks which defined policy objectives, the scope of
services to be covered, and quality standards. They also provided significant financial
support. Finally, when the schemes became more significant in their scope, legislation
for mandatory membership and cross-subsidisation was passed.
The Cooperative Medical System (CMS) in China provides another example of the
importance of government support.98 In the 1980s, political and financial support for the
CMS was withdrawn by the central government, and local financial resources
diminished due to the collapse of the collective system. As a result, by the mid-1990s,
only 8% of the rural population were still covered,114,116 compared to a coverage of over
90% at the scheme’s peak.8,54,99,100,101 The loss of political commitment and state financial
support were key factors contributing to the collapse.
In Thailand, there has been longstanding central government involvement in
community financing.102 There has been increasing integration between schemes and
III.The literature review of CBHI         35
36 Options for scaling up community-based health insurance for rural communities in Armenia
the public health system at the policy level, at the service delivery level, and in terms of
public health financing and management. Management of the health card scheme has
been integrated with the management structure of the public health system, first at the
district level, then regionally and provincially. This was intended to increase the sise of
risk pools, and to overcome the problems related to the variable quality of fund
management. It has been useful for ensuring that schemes have access to the necessary
technical and managerial expertise to develop more complex risk-management
mechanisms such as inter-regional risk pooling and re-insurance, although there remains
a recognised need for further capacity building in key areas such as actuarial accounting
and risk management.
However, as some authors have observed, the failure to integrate multiple
government-supported risk pools (health card scheme, publicly funded care for the
elderly and children, government-supported insurance schemes for civil servants and
state enterprise employees) is problematic from the point of view of both efficiency and
equity. It increases administrative costs, can lead to cream skimming, and makes it very
difficult to assess the impact of subsidies and ensure that they are equitably channelled
through the different schemes.
In Rwanda, community health financing has been incorporated into national health
policy and health sector reform strategies. One example of this process is the
introduction of user fees – without which there would be no incentive to join the
schemes – concurrently with the establishment of Community Health Funds, a form of
prepayment scheme for primary care services targeted at the rural population and the
informal sector. “The Community Health Fund Act” in 2001 established Community
Health Funds as part of the official health financing plan at the local/community level.
The objective from the outset has been that the Community Health Fund mechanisms
should be scaled up nationally, and the schemes have been integrated into the
management structure of the public health system. Tapping into existing managerial
expertise has enabled the rapid scaling up of the schemes. However, this approach has
not been without trouble; problems identified include a need to strengthen the capacity
of the District Health Management Team to provide supervision and technical support,
and a need for capacity building in key technical areas, including financial management
and health information systems. The top-down approach to integration has also
undermined community participation; there is a recognised need to develop mechanisms
to encourage community participation in managing the Community Health Funds as
scaling up continues.
The Ghanaian government has also recently introduced the National Health
Insurance Act (2003), mandating that all districts establish CBHI schemes. However,
early indications are that there have been problems with the rapid scaling up of CBHI,
particularly related to health system capacities in key areas. 
The integration between community financing schemes and the government-
supported system at a managerial level can create problems; the issue is essentially one
of trust, accountability and legitimacy. For example, in Vietnam community
management structures, and their close links to government in terms of management,
supervision and planning, have led to negative perceptions of the schemes (as
‘government schemes’). This undermines the schemes; suspicion of state involvement
has been identified as a constraint to increasing participation.
Scaling up community financing: determinants of success
Development and scaling up community financing is dependent on socio-economic
and political context in a country – a successful model in one context may not be
replicable in other settings.117 Nevertheless, certain factors appear to be associated with
sustainable schemes that contribute usefully to increased coverage and financial
protection. Carrin and James have identified a number of factors that facilitate the
transition to universal coverage via social health insurance, and their work has informed
the discussion that follows.118 
The first factor is rising income levels due to economic growth. Increasing levels of
income are important for two reasons. First, as people become richer, they are more
likely to be able to afford contributions to voluntary financing schemes. Second,
increasing incomes increase government tax revenues, allowing them to support scaling
up financially; subsidies for the poorest are essential if they are to be included. Korea,
Germany and Japan illustrate the importance of relative affordability and subsidies for
achieving good coverage with health insurance schemes. However, China, Thailand,
Vietnam and the Dana Sehat schemes in Indonesia (which had an estimated total
membership of 21 million in 2000)54 suggest that even at lower income levels,
community financing mechanisms can make a significant contribution to increasing
coverage provided schemes are well designed and there is sustained government
commitment and subsidies.
Addressing the risk of scheme bankruptcy as a consequence of unpredictable
fluctuations in demand is also important if scaled up schemes are to be financially
sustainable. Reinsurance, whereby individual schemes insure against such risk, has been
recently promoted as one solution to this issue,119 although this strategy may be difficult
to implement in countries with under-developed capital markets and financial
institutions. Government underwriting of such risk is another solution. Both
mechanisms would need to deal with potential negative impacts on efficiency; if a third
party will make good the deficits of scheme budgets, there is less incentive to control
costs.  
Another important factor relates to the characteristics of the population to be
covered, including its age structure, socio-economic differentials and the relative sises of
the urban and rural populations. A number of authors have highlighted the importance
of the relative sises of the formal and informal sectors as a determinant of the feasibility
of introducing voluntary and social health insurance (Bennett, Carrin, James, etc.). The
urbanisation that accompanies growth increases the sise of the formal sector and
increases population densities; both make collection of contributions easier, and higher
population densities make service delivery more cost-effective. Informally employed and
rural populations in sparsely populated areas are more difficult to include in insurance
schemes and to provide services for; including them in national insurance mechanisms
requires significant subsidies and appropriate scheme design. The age structure is
important not only because the dependency ratio affects per capita resource availability,
but also because it affects patterns of morbidity; in many settings, chronic disease –
which is typically more prevalent in older age groups – poses significant challenges to
community-based schemes because it increases demand and therefore costs.
Scaling up community financing also faces constraints related to health system
deficiencies.120 In many settings the care that can be provided under community
financing schemes is limited by deficits in health system capacity, including shortages of
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human resources, poor infrastructure, and inadequate supplies of drugs and medical
consumables. Legislative constraints on the clinical roles of health practitioners – such
as nurses not being allowed to prescribe drugs and specialist monopolies on certain types
of service provision – limit the feasibility of increasing benefits packages. Sufficient
managerial and technical capacity is also central to scheme development, and a lack of
capacity in these areas constrains scaling up. In many cases, donor commitment is
essential to support scheme development; a lack of donor commitment to long-term
funding constrains scaling up.
Many of the shortcomings of CBHI relate to problems with scheme design, weak
management and a lack of institutional development.8,54,76,102,121 For small schemes,
initiating NGOs provide the necessary technical support; developing local capacity in
key areas is seen as essential to ensuring institutional sustainability once NGO technical
support is withdrawn.10,47,62,102 Hsiao reports that in China a lack of organisational
capacity and a lack of policy support from higher level government were cited by 40%
of community leaders as a reason for the failure to restart the Cooperative Medical
System.54 Poor organisation and managerial failure has also been cited as one of the
explanations for the weak performance of the voluntary CBHI in Vietnam,73 and for
problems with the introduction of inter-regional risk pooling and scaling up the health
card scheme in Thailand.54,102 As risk pools expand and the packages of services covered
by schemes increase, demand for managerial and technical expertise increases; scaling
up must be accompanied by a scaling up of technical and managerial support
mechanisms, and building indigenous management and technical capacity is central to
this process. Setting up umbrella organisations to provide the necessary technical and
managerial support as community financing schemes are scaled is one suggested solution
to this problem.8,62 Such organisations have been established in both Senegal and
Ghana, for example.10
High levels of social capital are necessary at the scheme level; expansion and a move
to social insurance similarly require high levels of social capital. High levels of social
capital are central to maintaining transparent and accountable local management
structures, which mean that members are more likely to trust the scheme and believe
they will receive their entitlements; this encourages people to join voluntary schemes.
Social capital underpins an acceptance of cross-subsidisation. Community ownership
also gives legitimacy to the schemes as representatives of communities are able to
facilitate their input into the evolution of the health policy agenda. Low levels of social
capital, due to migration, heterogeneous populations, and a distrust of government
institutions can hinder scheme development. For example, Jowett et al identified
suspicion of state-implemented schemes in Vietnam as one of the constraints to
increasing membership. 
Linking insurance schemes to livelihoods programmes such as micro credit schemes
has been successful in overcoming affordability as a barrier to scheme membership, as
shown by the example of the BRAC scheme in Bangladesh. 
The importance of political stewardship and good governance in expanding access to
care and financial protection has been increasingly recognised in recent years.2
Harmonising the objectives of community financing with the national health policy
objectives seems to be important as CBHI is scaled up. Political commitment by
governments that translated into the development of appropriate legislative frameworks
and sustained financial support was central to the move towards universal coverage in
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Japan, Korea, and Germany. It has also been important in contemporary low-income
settings such as Thailand and Rwanda for making progress towards this goal through the
implementation of community financing mechanisms. Generally, as membership of
schemes increases and a transition to universal coverage becomes feasible, compulsory
membership is mandated in order to maximise risk-sharing and cross-subsidy. 
Some authors point out that even if technical capacity is adequate, poor governance
or prescriptive government-led “top-down” approaches may undermine scheme
transparency, accountability, local ownership and responsiveness to needs.89,112 Scaling up
community schemes in these circumstances and linking them to the wider system may
not produce the desired benefits, such as expanded coverage and community
ownership.112
Integration of community financing with existing health systems and policies appears
to be a prerequisite for successful scaling up of CBHI and increasing the scope of services.
However, although integration of financing flows and service provision can help to
avoid duplication and achieve economies of scale, donor-supported schemes often
operate in parallel to the government services. As the examples of the Thai health card
and the CMS in China illustrate, integration is central to expanding coverage,
increasing the scope of services, increasing efficiency and sustainability. In Thailand,
inter-regional risk pooling, the setting up of a re-insurance mechanism, and developing
capitation-based payment systems for providers were possible only as a result of the
significant technical capacity within the public health system. Voluntary schemes can
bring innovation and skills to the broader health system, as the historical development
of Germany’s SHI schemes illustrates.  
Integration is also needed because new technologies, longer treatment regimens for
HIV/AIDS and TB, and the challenge of increasing chronic disease burdens in
developing countries create increased demand for health services that involve different
types of health professionals at different levels of care. More efficient purchasing and
distribution of drugs also requires the development of integrated systems at some level.
Similarly, rational prescribing – which could significantly reduce costs and make drugs
more accessible – is predicated on the development and implementation of an essential
drug list at a national level.83,86,122 A failure to develop mechanisms to integrate schemes
with the wider systems and ensure that scheme-level objectives complement national
objectives may hamper institutional and financial sustainability of the schemes.123
However, the process of integration of community financing with the mainstream
system can create complex technical demands. For example, the Thai experience shows
that integration is administratively complex, and dependent on large investments in
health information systems and building the management capacity of fund managers. As
coverage increases and smaller schemes are merged into larger risk pools, there may be
significant demand to develop new financing mechanisms (e.g. capitation-based
subsidies, re-insurance, inter-regional risk pooling). New remuneration mechanisms may
also be needed to link provider payment to the quantity and quality of services delivered.
These developments would require building integrated health information systems,
defining basic care packages, implementing quality control measures and establishing
independent regulators, as well as institutionalising the separation of purchaser and
provider functions. 
Attempts to scale up CBHI must find a balance between delivering effective services
that meet communities’ needs and ensuring that the cost of joining schemes remains
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affordable. There is also a tension between maximising health outcomes, which
necessitates that priority be given to preventative and primary health care services
(which benefit the poorest groups most), and providing protection against catastrophic
health expenditure via covering hospital care (which affects the poorest groups most).
Schemes should continue to evolve over time and be flexible enough to respond to new
economic and social realities, changing morbidity and population trends, medical
technologies and reforming health systems.
IV.The Armenian Context
Country background and health system reform in Armenia
Armenia, with a land area of 29,400 km2, is the smallest of the three South Caucasus
states in sise. It has a population of 3.2 million, of whom 1.2 million live in the capital
Yerevan;124 97% of the population are ethnic Armenians.125 There is a large Armenian
diaspora living mainly in the US, the Middle East and France. In terms of geography,
Armenia is a landlocked, mountainous country, subject to earthquakes, which borders
Georgia, Aserbaijan, Turkey and Iran. Previously a part of the USSR, with the break up
of the Soviet Union, Armenia seceded in September 1991. Armenia is now a republic
with a parliamentary democracy, although there are concerns about how free and fair
elections have been, and there are problems with endemic corruption. 
Armenia suffered from a severe economic contraction in the early 1990s due to the
economic blockade imposed by Turkey and Aserbaijan in response to the hostilities over
Nagorny Karabakh and the economic consequences of the break up of the former Soviet
Union. The World Bank estimated that the real GDP of Armenia contracted by 50% in
1992, with a further 14.8% contraction in 1993.126 However, it has been growing
strongly since 1995 in response to an ambitious IMF-sponsored economic reform
programme; annual average real GDP growth is expected to remain at about 7.5%.127
GDP per capita is estimated to be $5,100 (2005), although income is very inequitably
distributed – the poorest 10% of households account for 2.3% of total household income
compared to the 46.2% accounted for by the wealthiest 10% (1999).127 Poverty remains
widespread, especially in rural areas; unemployment is estimated to be around 30%
(2003), and 43% of the population are below the poverty line (2003).
Life expectancy, which in the early 1980s was the highest of all the Soviet republics,
fell in the early years after independence, but since the mid-1990s it has been climbing
steadily, well above the CIS levels (Appendix: Figure 1). Falling life expectancy in the
first half of the 1990s was a reflection of worsening adult health due to increases in
cardiovascular diseases, cancer, diabetes, tuberculosis, and other diseases, and a failure to
achieve a sustained improvement in all-cause mortality, with the exception of infant
mortality where progress has been made (Appendix: Figure 2 & 3). The incidence of
major communicable diseases such as tuberculosis and HIV/AIDS has increased, and
there have been outbreaks of malaria, which had previously been controlled. Maternal
and child health have suffered because of diminished access to and poor quality of health
care. Outbreaks of waterborne diseases were caused by the degradation of poorly
maintained water supply, and sanitation networks have also been a problem. Tobacco
consumption is rising rapidly, and drug abuse by adolescents is starting to be a cause for
concern.
The economic contraction led to a collapse in government revenue and low total
health expenditure as a percentage of GDP, despite some temporary increases due to
external assistance (Appendix: Figure 4). As a result, there was a 35% decline in health
expenditure, and the Armenian government was forced to introduce user fees in 1996.
By 1999 only 25% of total health expenditure was still government funded and – due to
formal user fees and informal payments – out-of-pocket expenditure had increased to
about 60% of total health care expenditure; the remaining 15% of health care funding
was from external sources. Out-of-pocket expenditure is extremely high compared to the
average levels for the CIS region (Appendix: Figure 5). A study found informal payment
in Armenia to be the second highest among eight former Soviet Union countries
(Appendix: Figure 6 & 7).128 Despite the introduction of a state-funded Basic Benefits
Package (BBP) seeking to cover vulnerable groups and high priority public health
services (Box 3), utilisation rates have declined dramatically. The earlier mentioned
study has shown that in Armenia people commonly report not accessing care for serious
conditions in the previous year, or do not plan to use it if the need arises in the future
(Appendix: Figure 7 & 9). Due to the deteriorating infrastructure and unavailable BBP
service at the primary care level, in Armenia the use of hospitals and other secondary
care facilities is more frequent than elsewhere in the region (Appendix: Figure 8). At
the same time, the longer travel distance to facilities and the high prevalence of informal
payments at hospitals are likely to deter utilisation of services, among poorer and
disadvantaged groups.
Box 3. Services funded publicly under the Basic Benefits Package 2000
Armenia is continuing to implement further reforms of its health system, including
efforts to enhance the role of primary health care. Ambulatory-based doctors have been
retrained as family medicine practitioners,v and significant investments have been made
in infrastructure. However, despite improvements in both access and quality of care, the
impact of reforms to date has been limited at the most peripheral levels of the health
system; poor rural communities still face significant access barriers. Furthermore, the
benefits of government financing are also inequitably distributed – consumption of
government-financed health services in 1999 by the richest 20% of the population was
three times higher than that of the poorest 20%.129
Other key reform areas have included decentralisation and the introduction of
market mechanisms. The Ministry of Health has retained a planning and regulatory role;
the independent State Health Agency (SHA), set up in 1997, now acts as the sole
purchaser of care. The price and volume of services delivered under the BBP are
determined by the MoH, but reimbursements are significantly lower than the real
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• Hygiene and the control of epidemic diseases
• Primary health care
• Medical care for children
• Obstetric and gynaecological services
• Medical care for vulnerable groups
• Communicable disease control
• Non-communicable disease control
• Emergency health care
v Ambulatories in Armenia are the most peripheral level of primary health care service delivery to
be staffed by doctors.
treatment costs.  There are also plans to replace the tax-based health financing with a
national compulsory social health insurance, although the feasibility of doing so is
constrained by current economic circumstances. Legislation for SHI has been passed, but
its introduction has been postponed until economic circumstances are more favourable.
The Oxfam (GB) CBHI schemes in Armenia
Since 1995, in response to inadequate government financing of basic PHC services
and the inequity of access outlined above, Oxfam GB, in partnership with a local NGO
“Support to Communities”, has been pioneering community-based health insurance
(CBHI) schemes to provide essential primary health care that is affordable, equitable,
and accessible to all, especially the very poor. These aim to increase access to basic PHC
for rural communities – via addressing gaps in provision – while reducing the impact of
unpredictable out-of-pocket expenses on households.  By 2001, schemes were
operational in 80 villages in Vayots Dzor and Syunik marz, which represented
approximately 10% of rural communities in Armenia, and covered around 50,000
people. Currently, if the villages covered by World Vision in partnership with Support
to Communities are included, schemes are operating in 128 villages and cover 80,000
people.
The regions chosen are poor, with an agricultural economy, and are relatively
inaccessible due to mountainous geography and poor public transport links. Prior to the
establishment of the schemes, basic health care was provided via village-based health
posts that were under-resourced and staffed by poorly paid nurses with little support and
minimal ongoing education. These nurses were poorly motivated and the quality of care
they could offer was low. Outreach services from higher PHC levels had largely ceased.
The schemes aim to provide essential primary health care via the village health posts,
which is accessible to all, especially the very poor. In return for a fixed quarterly
contribution of 2,000 Armenian drams per family (about US$ 4.5), the schemes cover
unlimited first aid, basic PHC and drugs, and some referral to higher level facilities.
However, the health post nurses are only able to deliver a limited scope of care due to
legislative restrictions on their prescribing. To overcome this constraint, outreach visits
to the villages by ambulatory-based doctors have been facilitated. The Oxfam CBHI
model promotes community involvement in the financial management of schemes via
accountable and transparent local management structures, and exemption procedures
cover on average 5% of families. 
Recently, two Healthcare Foundations have been created in Vayots Dzor and Syunik,
which have a managerial and supervisory responsibility towards the individual schemes.
These foundations have a board of trustees with representatives from local authorities,
Oxfam, Support to Communities, and local communities; they each have four staff
employed to carry out financial audits and provide budget oversight of the individual
schemes within the regions.
IV.The Armenian context         43
Evaluations of the Oxfam CBHI schemes
The Armenia scheme was evaluated externally in 1999,130 and again in 2001.131 The
first evaluation used quantitative and qualitative methods: a structured interview of 135
randomly selected participants in the scheme and 132 randomly selected non-
participants, as well as focus group discussions, and open-ended interviews with health
care providers in villages where schemes were operating (February – March 1999). A
review of drug procurement and dispensing records was also carried out to enable cost
recovery rates to be calculated. Some of the most relevant findings and positive benefits
include: 
• Families joining the schemes made considerably greater use of the health post 
facilities; the schemes increased access to basic health care for participants.
Participants used the health post more frequently – 92% had used the rural health 
facilities, compared to 59% of non-participants – although this may have been due to
slightly higher morbidity in participants. Participants were also more likely to receive
medication – 94% of participants received medication compared to 36% of non-
participants. However, it is reasonable to suggest that a significant proportion of the
increased utilisation was due to improved access – among non-participants who had
used alternatives to the health post, 43% stated that it was because they could not 
afford to pay for care. 
• The schemes were valued by members. 90% of participants believed that the 
schemes had had an important positive influence on the health of their communities
and families. Interestingly, 74% of non-participants also thought that the schemes 
had benefited their communities and families, presumably because of the 
infrastructure improvements, improved quality of services and increased availability 
of drugs (even if they had to pay for them).
• Perceived quality of care may have had an impact on the participation. Participants
had a higher opinion of both the health care providers and the quality of services on
offer: 75% rated the health care provider as good or excellent, and 71% rated the 
services as good or excellent. In comparison, 60% of non-participants rated the 
health care provider as good or excellent, and 51% rated the services as good or 
excellent.
• Participation in the scheme increased access to free drugs; there was significant 
unmet need for medication for chronic conditions (not covered by the scheme).
Among participants, 90% received free medication when it was prescribed for an 
acute presentation, compared to 18% of non-participants. 47% of participants 
claimed to need medication that they could not access through their scheme, largely
medication for symptomatic relief (analgesics and antihistamines) or for chronic 
conditions (particularly antihypertensive and diabetic medications). Average out-of-
pocket expenditure on drugs was higher among participants than non-participants 
(21,310 dram compared to 8,835 dram), again perhaps suggesting that their burden of
disease was higher.
• The major reason given for non-participation in the schemes was financial 
constraints. This was cited by 79% of non-participants as their major reason for not
joining. A lack of information on the schemes was cited by 14% of non-participants;
a lack of trust was cited by only 6%. 
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• There was significant community involvement in the running of the schemes. 33%
of participants had been involved in organising or administering the schemes. 
Broader community involvement existed via the democratic election of treasurers.
• The average cost-recovery rate for drugs dispensed was 86%.
• The percentage of contributions collected was 76%. However, 87% of debts were 
eventually recovered; debts were paid back when seasonal income allowed. This 
means that the eventual percentage of contributions collected is of the order of 97%.
• The accounting and book keeping system was good. It was suggested that 
improvements in supervision and auditing were needed; this was seen as vital to 
improve the management and sustainability of the schemes.
• There was significant unmet need because of the narrow scope of the schemes.
Many participants had to buy drugs not available through the schemes, and 60% were
willing to pay more for a more generous benefit package. 
The second evaluation, conducted in 2001,131 collected data through a randomised
survey of 12 villages in Armenia to assess the economic benefits of the schemes; key
informant interviews were also carried out. A detailed financial analysis was carried out
to enable a calculation of the schemes’ costs and the degree to which total costs and
drug-related recurrent costs were covered by contributions. However, it should be
understood that, as the report stressed, the schemes were never intended to be
financially sustainable based on generated income. Capital costs were converted into
equivalent annual cost using a standard accounting discounting procedure. The
financial analysis suggests that the subsidy needed to sustain the system is likely to
remain over 90%. Given that evidence from other countries suggests that people place
great importance on the availability of drugs, and are willing to pay for them at
reasonable prices, and given the results of the financial analysis, it should be possible to
achieve full cost recovery for drug costs.  The major conclusions from the survey were:
• Membership of the schemes greatly increased utilisation. This increased use was not
because of adverse selection. Families joining the schemes had a similar composition
and similar levels of chronic disease to non-member families.
• Non-members delayed treatment seeking due to the cost implications of seeking 
care; they opt for either no treatment or self-treatment instead.
• Members receive most of their primary care consultations and medication free of
charge.
• Participation rates remain low in certain areas.
• Higher proportions of ex-members and non-members purchase drugs from private
pharmacies, incurring significant out-of-pocket expenses for consultations and 
medications. This out-of-pocket expenditure is highest for groups from villages 
without a community-based health insurance scheme.
• Out-of-pocket expenditure on medication not covered by the community-based 
health insurance scheme, which includes medication for chronic diseases, is 
similar for all groups (insured, ex-members, non-members in RDF-villages, and 
people in non-RDF villages). 
• Economic barriers to accessing care remain; families identified as poor who are 
required to pay for medication are less likely to do so, and are more likely to resort to
borrowing to cover drug costs.
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• The average monthly cost of accessing primary health care for non-member 
families was AMD 300 compared to AMD 500 for member families. However, the
lower average primary care costs for non-members are due to lower rates of 
consultation and self-treatment via purchasing of drugs from private pharmacies; this
suggests that non-members pay less money but access care that is of lower quality.
• The reasons for non-participation in the scheme related mainly to a lack of a 
steady monthly cash income, although other factors may also play a role. It was not
possible from the study alone to measure the relative importance of absolute poverty,
perceived quality of care, and perceptions relating to value for money.
• Families from villages without a community-based health insurance scheme have 
higher average primary care costs, and would benefit most from the introduction of
such a scheme.
• The schemes are cost effective. The financial evaluation clearly demonstrates that 
the schemes, which cost an average of $4,651 (US) per year for each nurse-run village
health post (including the supply of essential drugs), have proven to be a very cost-
effective way of delivering primary health care to isolated rural communities in 
Armenia (Table 2). In terms of cost recovery rates (Table 3), the scheme recovers 
5.3% of total costs (capital costs, central office costs, recurrent costs, and drug costs),
11.1% of recurrent costs, but the cost recovery rates increased up to 80.4% when only
drug costs were considered. Central office costs made up 26% of the total cost of the
scheme, partly due to the cost of expatriate staff; a purely locally run scheme would 
have a better potential for cost recovery. Capital costs for refurbishing buildings, 
purchasing equipment and vehicles at 24% of total cost, and incentive payments at 
15% of total cost (a component of recurrent costs), while significant, are justifiable 
because they are so central to the schemes’ overall success.
Table 2. Average costs per health post
Table 3. Average cost recovery rates per health post
Type of cost
Capital costs
Central office costs
Recurrent costs
Drug costs
Total cost per 
health post
US$
0
1,219
1,952
367
4,651
% of total annual cost
24
26
42
8
100
Cost recovery rates
% of all costs
% of costs, excluding central staff and
office costs
% of recurrent costs only
% of drug costs only
% of costs
5.3
7.0
11.1
80.4
As well as the Oxfam-supported schemes, there are also other PHC-focused CBHI
schemes in Armenia supported by World Vision, Mission East, and Future Generations
Union/N(o)vib. Most of these schemes are currently planning to increase their
coverage. With maturity and expansion of community-based PHC financing schemes in
Armenia, questions regarding their long-term sustainability and policy implications
arise. Their financial sustainability is threatened by the increasing prevalence of chronic
illness, affordability barriers to joining the schemes, and a lack of long-term government
or donor subsidy. Furthermore, non-communicable diseases often require treatment at
secondary care level, imposing demands on the CBHI schemes to coordinate responses
at primary and secondary level of care. The prospects for institutional sustainability of
community-driven schemes in view of national financing reforms and governance issues
at the regional and national level is also unclear. As with any donor-supported
programme, withdrawal of donor support appears to be a serious threat for the future of
community-managed health schemes.
Table 4. Benefits and limitations of the current Oxfam schemes
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BENEFITS
• Cost-effective access to basic primary 
health care, with no payment at time of 
use.
• Exemption mechanisms to facilitate 
access for the poorest.
• Additional revenue generation, covering 
80.4% of the cost of drugs, with potential 
for higher cost recovery; this is important 
given the existing financial constraints 
within the health system.
• Locally accountable and transparent 
management structures, in a setting 
where there are significant governance 
issues. 
• Removal of geographical access barriers.
• Catalysing PHC reform at the peripheral 
level of the health system via 
infrastructure improvements, training and 
motivating staff.
• Educating communities about insurance.
• Empowerment of rural communities 
giving them a voice in the political debate 
on health sector reform and pro-poor 
financing.
LIMITATIONS
• Limited scope of services covered. There 
is limited chronic diseases care, and no 
hospital care due to financial and human 
resource constraints (limited prescribing 
by nurses and constraints in the services 
that they are allowed to provide).
• Average participation rates of 40% 
(although this compares well to 
international norms). 
• Exclusion of some of the poorest who 
cannot afford to join the schemes and 
therefore cannot benefit from the 
subsidy invested in supporting the 
schemes. 
• Limited integration with the broader 
health system.
• Lack of differential levels of 
contributions; there are not currently 
different packages of care for different 
premiums. 

V. Scaling Up CBHI in Armenia:
A Qualitative Study
Objectives and methods
The study sought to identify the major constraints and opportunities for scaling up
community-based health insurance in Armenia. It explored the extent to which CBHI
expansion is feasible and desirable given capacity and funding constraints, societal
values and the existing policy environment. The acceptability of the schemes from a
community perspective and the determinants of participation were also examined. 
Data were collected using a mixture of methods. Key informant interviews were used
to examine the desirability and feasibility of scaling up community insurance in terms
of: equity, efficiency and impact on quality of care; the scope of the care package;
provider payment mechanisms; and financial sustainability. Using semi-structured
questionnaires (one for the national and another for the sub-national level), 18 key
informants were interviewed in the capital Yerevan, and 12 in the two regions with
CBHI schemes. Respondents were identified through an iterative procedure – an initial
list was developed specifying the institutional affiliations and areas of expertise required,
respondents were approached, and further individuals were identified via snowballing.
The respondents included: high-level government officials; heads of hospitals and
polyclinics; family physicians; major donors; academics and consultants advising on
health sector reform; and NGOs involved in developing community financing models.
At the local level, the staff of Oxfam’s local NGO partner, health post nurses, and heads
of village councils were interviewed. Following the grounded theory approach, topics
were covered in the interviews until saturation was reached;132,133 subsequent interviews
were focused on filling in gaps in the data. The interviews were fully transcribed, data
reduced to essential points and analysed thematically. Triangulation was used to check
the validity of conclusions.
In each clinic, the medically trained lead researcher assessed quality of care through
proxies such as appropriateness of infrastructure and equipment, drug availability, record
keeping, reference material, and clinical procedures. Results were recorded on a quality
of care checklist. 
Community perspectives were explored through focus group discussions (FGDs).
These were conducted in accordance with the recommendations of Barbour and
Kitzinger (1999)134 in three villages with Oxfam-supported community-based health
insurance schemes. The villages had low, intermediate and high participation rates –
around 10%, 40% and 90%, respectively. There were two FGDs per village, one for
members and one for non-members. Each consisted of up to 8–10 respondents recruited
according to pre-defined selection criteria to ensure that the groups were broadly
representative of the population in terms of gender, age, and health status. A discussion
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guide outlining the main topics to be covered was developed and piloted. An
experienced Armenian moderator conducted the discussions, which were monitored by
the British team through simultaneous translation. The moderator sought to stimulate
debate and ensure inclusiveness so that the breadth of opinions could be assessed and
the dominant views ascertained. The factors influencing families’ decisions to join and
stay in schemes that were studied included: village sise and location; perceptions of
quality and value for money; levels of social capital (via questions adapted from the
World Bank’s Social Capital Assessment Toolkit);135 attitudes towards risk and risk
pooling; and patterns of service utilisation.
Perspectives from the qualitative research on the Armenian health system
Organisation of the PHC system
In urban areas PHC is delivered mainly via polyclinics, which offer a full range of
services. In contrast, the most accessible PHC facilities in rural areas – provided via
health posts (staffed by nurses) or feldshers (doctor-run PHC clinics) – offer only a
limited package of services. Despite this, health posts are the usual point of first contact
with the health system for both members and non-members of the schemes. This was a
reflection of the proximity of the health post to where people live, the availability of the
health post nurse 24 hours a day, and the respect that communities have for the nurses.
The health post nurses provide first aid and symptomatic relief and they fulfil an
important advisory, triage and referral function; by giving people advice as to the
seriousness of their health problem and the urgency with which it should be dealt, nurses
enable patients to make more informed decisions about how important it is for them to
access higher levels of care.
To access care for chronic diseases and curative PHC, people from rural villages must
reach population centres with more than 2000 people. These centres are served by
ambulatories and polyclinics staffed by physicians, nurses and midwives. There are
attempts to increase access to care for rural villages via outreach services; however, such
services are infrequent (one visit per month), and many villages do not receive them.
The impact of health system reform to date – service deficits and quality of care
Primary health care is a stated government priority, and there have been significant
recent increases in the budget allocation for it. Some key informants (KIs) at regional
and central levels felt that with recent increases in funding, there had been some
improvements:
“There has been 2-3 years of significant investment aimed at improving services and 
providing free access to PHC for vulnerable groups and free access to some inpatient 
services. Improvements have resulted; drugs are available, there are enough to meet 
demand.” (KI, regional level)
“In villages where the ambulatory has been renovated, and staff have been retrained in family
medicine, surveys have shown that patient and provider satisfaction are much higher, 
utilisation has increased, and out-of-pocket expenditure has decreased.” (KI, central level)
However, many village-level and NGO key informants, some central level key
informants  and the FGD participants felt that there had been few improvements in access
to PHC and drugs for isolated rural communities as a result of the PHC reform efforts:
“Maybe there are some in the upper levels of the system, but certainly at the lower levels we
have not felt anything, we have not felt any improvements.” (KI, NGO, regional level) 
Despite the state-funded Basic Benefits Package (BBP) – which is supposed to provide
free access to basic PHC for vulnerable groups – people in rural communities are not able
to access the PHC services that they need due to geographical and financial access
barriers:
“PHC services are needed by the rural population. Many villages do not have access to state
provided care due to a lack of communications and because of isolation and a lack of 
transport. It is often easier to reach the regional centre via bus than it is to reach 
ambulatories.” (KI, regional level)
Many key informants reported that preventative care generally is lacking, especially
at peripheral PHC levels; immunisation is a notable exception. There are no pap smears,
and insufficient screening for hypertension or diabetes. The quality of care was also
frequently mentioned as a problem, particularly for health care providers that have yet
to benefit from reform programmes: 
“The major problem currently is access to good quality care; there is access currently but the
care is far from good quality.” (KI, central level)
“A number of challenges remain, particularly in the ambulatories that have yet to benefit 
from the Primary Health Care Development Programme.vi …In these ambulatories there 
are still significant problems: the infrastructure is poor, staff skills are limited, staff are poorly
paid and utilisation rates are low. There are human resource problems in rural PHC in 
Armenia too. It is unattractive to providers to work in rural areas; smaller communities 
mean that providers get paid less because they attract less capitation-based funding.”
(KI, central level)
“In rural areas there are problems in all areas of service delivery. The quality of care provided
is a major issue. There is a need for rehabilitation, provision of equipment and training of 
staff…” (senior government KI)
The NGO key informants and a number of central- and regional-level key informants
noted that maternal and child health services at the health post level are very poor due
to a combination of lack of skills and knowledge, as well as infrastructure deficits. The
focus group discussions confirmed that there was a need for better access to obstetric and
gynaecological services:
“The women in the village get sick a lot. There are not gynaecological services for them; they
can’t afford to get access to specialists.” (FGD, non-members, Rind)
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vi The World Bank’s Primary Health Care Development Programme.
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A number of key informants felt that there are inadequate services for the diagnosis
and treatment of sexually transmitted infections. They further noted that the prevalence
of STIs is increasing, and that the true incidence is probably underestimated in official
statistics; if people are not screened or routinely tested, reported cases will underestimate
the prevalence. Other services that the FGDs and village-level key informants identified
as being difficult to access included dental care and specialist care. Several key
informants also stated that access to psychiatric services was limited.
Some of the problems identified by key informants related to patients themselves;
poor health knowledge, reluctance on the part of individuals to take responsibility for
their own health, and health-damaging behaviour (unsafe sex, poor diets, smoking,
alcohol and drug abuse) were frequently cited. Late treatment seeking was also identified
by many key informants as a problem that needed to be addressed:
“People do not seek medical attention until it is too late… because of the late presentation,
it may be beyond the capability of the hospital to do anything. People present too late to be 
treated effectively or cured. This is why we have a local saying: ‘in hospital you are not 
cured, you are disabled’.” (KI, NGO, regional level)
A lack of knowledge within communities about their entitlements under the BBP was
also identified as a problem by a number of key informants: 
“There is also a poor knowledge of entitlements. This needs to be addressed, but there are
limited communication channels; there is poor radio coverage, and newspapers are not available
in many villages.” (KI, regional level)
It was also suggested that even where people are aware of their entitlements, there is
a fear of challenging authority and engaging with government structures, which makes
it hard for people to demand their entitlements and to confront corruption such as
informal payments.
Financing rural PHC in Armenia – rhetoric versus reality
There are significant financial barriers to rural communities accessing care at all
levels of the health system (“It all depends on money. If you have money, you can always
get treatment; if you are poor, it is hard.” [elderly man, FGD, non-members, Shgharshik]).
These barriers are the result of widespread poverty, and a dramatic increase in both
formal and informal out-of-pocket payments, which account for an estimated 60% of
total health expenditure.126 Informal payments are endemic at the hospital level and for
accessing specialist care, although as many key informants pointed out, they need to be
understood as a response to inadequate staff remuneration. For example, World Vision
has estimated that it costs about $200 to support a family, but a doctor’s salary is only
around $30 per month; doctors are forced to make up the difference by demanding
informal payments.
Informal payments result in people borrowing money and selling assets to pay for care.
Some are forced to forego care altogether:
“Some people don’t seek care or delay treatment because of the costs, especially for hospital
treatment. People raise the money with difficulty. They sell animals, they sell produce or they
have to borrow money. People recover from this, but it makes their lives harder.”
(KI, NGO)
“We have forgotten about the hospital: we go there, we can’t afford to pay for any treatment,
we come back… what is the point.” (FGD, non-members, Shgharshik)
The financial barriers to accessing hospital care are particularly severe:
“Some people are unable to afford surgery such as gynaecological surgery for fibroids, others
can’t afford to stay in hospital or they can’t afford to pay for the follow up at the hospital. 
That is why the surgery department at Vyot Dzor is empty.” (KI, Rind)
“It costs 20,000 drams (about 45 US$) to be admitted to hospital, and then there are other
charges depending on what needs to be done.” (KI, NGO, regional level)
“Surgery can be very expensive, for example it will cost a minimum of 200 US dollars to 
have a caesarean section.” (KI, NGO, regional level)
“Women are having home deliveries because they cannot afford to pay the payments that are
required if you deliver in the hospital.” (KI, village level)
Geographical barriers are also a problem, and the cost of the transport needed to
access higher level care is high:
“Transport is a problem. Our village is isolated and the road is not good. In winter it is very
difficult to even get to Vayk.” (FGD, non-members, Khndzorut)
“…there is often no bus so we have to walk. If the patient is too sick, we call the ambulance,
but then we have to pay.” (FGD, members, Shgharshik)
As a number of key informants pointed out, because of the financial and geographical
access barriers, access to care is much worse for rural communities compared to urban
communities.
Many key informants, while accepting that there is still a long way to go to remedy
the situation, felt that there have been real improvements in financial accessibility.
With increased funding for PHC services, the situation is slowly improving. As one
central-level key informant put it: “There is a higher probability that people can get access to
PHC for free”. Others suggested that while this was true for urban areas, the reforms have
to date had only a minor impact on the financial accessibility of services for isolated
rural communities.
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Resource allocation mechanisms are recognised to be weak, and rural health posts are
currently not receiving the funding that they are entitled to, although there have been
some recent improvements:
“There is a difference between the theory and the practice when it comes to health financing
in Armenia. This is especially true for rural communities. In theory, health posts were 
supposed to be financed via existing per capita funding arrangements; in reality they received
little or no funding, and many health post nurses were not even receiving their salaries. The
situation is improving, and in 2004 the salaries of HP nurses became protected. There is a l
ack of knowledge and understanding at higher policy levels about the reality with respect 
PHC services and living conditions in rural areas.” (KI, central level)
The BBP rarely functions as it is intended to, and often services that are supposed to
be free under the BBP are not. This is seen to stem from unrealistic funding of the
essential care package compounded by increasing demand – the resulting deficit is met
through formal and informal out-of-pocket payments from users:
“There is also a basic benefits package that entitles vulnerable people to free care. The list of
vulnerable people includes orphans, the poor and the disabled. In reality people do not get 
access to free care. Sometimes they have to pay anyway; sometimes they have to pay for 
drugs. Also many are not aware of their entitlements.” (KI, NGO)
“The polyclinic or hospital provide what ever they can, however patients often have to buy 
drugs. In reality, the BBP cannot always be provided for free. Any increase in demand for
services under the BBP does not result in increased funding.” (KI, regional level)
NGO and village-level key informants identified the related problem of the allocated
and disbursed funding not reaching some peripheral PHC facilities, particularly rural
health posts:
“Money is given by the state to the SHA and then disbursed to the polyclinics who are 
supposed to give it to the ambulatories and health posts. But, money is lost on the way. 
Money that is supposed to reach the health posts is used at higher levels to pay their electricity
bills, for example. The result is that there are no resources for health posts.” (KI, NGO)
Funding for providers under the BBP package is based on a simple capitation formula,
and established capitation rates currently bear little relationship to the actual cost of
delivering services; this is probably one of the factors driving the high levels of informal
payments. The per capita funding mechanism makes no allowance for the increased cost
of delivering an equivalent level of service to rural communities compared to urban
areas.  In fact, the urban capitation rate is higher than that for rural areas:
“The capitation payment is higher in urban areas to cover the increased cost of provision of
specialist care.” (KI, central level)
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There are currently no mechanisms to weight payments according to demographic
data related to poverty, isolation, or burden of disease, although there is a recognition on
the part of some central-level key informants that there is a need to introduce weighted
capitation to better match resources to need:
“The capitation-based funding for the financing of PHC services under the basic benefits 
package should be weighted to ensure increased per capita funding for rural communities, 
although there is resistance to this idea from the Ministry of Finance.” (KI, central level)
The MoH accepts the need to introduce weighted capitation as part of a mixed
provider payment system to create a better incentive mix directly linked to quality.
However, there is significant resistance to this idea from some quarters. Furthermore,
until the inadequacies of existing health information systems are addressed, it would not
be possible to introduce weighted capitation.
There are significant weaknesses in existing health information systems and in the
management and integration of data. This is a major constraint to linking provider
reimbursement to the delivery of specific services or to quality of care. In general, there
are weak links between remuneration of providers and the services provided. It is not
possible to link capitation payments directly to individual patients; money does not
follow patients. This prevents patient choice acting as an incentive for providers to
deliver better quality services. There are moves to address these issues, such as the
USAID/PADCO pilot projects in Lori Marz and Yerevan which have introduced
performance-related incentives.
Evidence-based treatment guidelines based on the Essential Drugs List (EDL) have
been approved for approximately 20 conditions and the World Bank has developed
national guidelines on quality of care, although to date these have had little impact on
prescriber behaviour. There have been significant problems with drug procurement and
distribution, and inadequate drug supplies have had a significant impact on service
utilisation. There are only weak central procurement or competitive tendering
mechanisms; scope to realise significant savings exists. While there is an EDL, there is
no legislation requiring practitioners to prescribe EDL drugs, and in practice it is not
widely used. Prescriber behaviour currently has relatively little impact on overall
patterns of drug consumption; the majority of prescription-only drugs are in fact sold
over the counter in pharmacies without a prescription – this is in breech of existing
legislation but is tolerated by the government because self-treatment is the only care
option for many people.
In summary, the impact of reforms has been patchy; some areas have benefited but
PHC reforms have had little impact at the most peripheral levels of the health system.
Rural communities still face significant financial access barriers (due to poverty and
formal and informal user fees) as well as geographical access barriers. Key challenges that
need to be met include the introduction of financing mechanisms ensuring that funds
follow patients and that remuneration is linked to performance, as well as increasing
funding and service delivery at peripheral levels of the PHC system. There is also a
recognised need for further rationalisation, and investment in infrastructure and human
resources. Significant reform issues still need to be addressed in the areas of health
information systems and coordination. There is a need to further develop evidence-
based clinical treatment guidelines and incorporate them into a standard treatment
V. Scaling up CBHI in Armenia: a qualitative study         55
manual; both are central to ongoing efforts to improve quality of care. Legislative
changes to facilitate the ongoing development of CBHI in Armenia will also be
required. There are a large number of ongoing initiatives at the PHC level, such as the
World Bank’s Primary Health Care Development Program and a variety of donor-funded
initiatives, which have significant implications for CBHI in Armenia and provide the
opportunity for CBHI schemes to develop strategic partnerships.
Does CBHI fit with health policy objectives and reform strategies?
The qualitative research revealed a consensus that CBHI was compatible with the
longer-term health policy objectives and national health priorities. There is a
particularly good fit with the increasing priority given to primary health care.129 It was
also considered closely aligned with the objectives of key donor-funded health reform
initiatives such as the World Bank’s Primary Health Care Development Program which
is facilitating the introduction of family medicine into Armenia, and USAID-supported
initiatives seeking to increase access to high quality primary care especially for rural
populations. This good fit with health policy objectives is important because it should
ensure that there is political support for scaling up CBHI, and it will help to ensure that
CBHI is synergistic with overall health sector reform.
As a number of key informants mentioned, the policy of promoting primary health
care has been supported by significant increases in the budget allocation for PHC – in
2004, for example, the PHC budget increased by approximately 25%. There are
opportunities for community insurance created by this and by the recognition at higher
policy levels that there are serious disparities between urban and rural areas in the
quality and accessibility of primary care: 
“The government is aware that there are inequalities with respect to access to health care in
Armenia. One response to the problem has been Health Care Optimisation, which involves
decreasing excess capacity to make more effective use of resources. Another strategy has been
to prioritise PHC.” (KI, non-governmental institution, central level)
However, the current focus of reforms is on the physician-staffed primary care clinics.
Basic service delivery at the nurse-run health post level in the villages where community
insurance operates is not high on the current policy agenda despite the fact that – as the
focus groups revealed – these facilities are the most accessible for rural communities and
were seen to provide a vital service.
Potential objectives for scaling up CBHI
There was no consensus amongst the key informants and the focus group discussions
as to the specific health policy objectives that an expanded CBHI should serve.
Typically, central-level key informants suggested that community insurance schemes
should aim to raise additional funds for primary care as a way of sharing responsibility for
health between the state and communities. However, it was widely recognised that the
ability of an expanded community insurance to raise significant extra revenue would be
limited by prevailing socio-economic conditions. They also saw a role for CBHI in
facilitating the introduction of compulsory social health insurance.
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However, there were differing views on whether community financing could facilitate
the introduction of social health insurance (SHI). The government has enacted
legislation for the introduction of SHI and a number of key informants felt that CBHI
could facilitate this. However, some key informants at higher policy levels thought that
this was not a feasible strategy currently as the socio-economic conditions constrain
both types of insurance. Several central-level key informants, while recognising the
benefits of larger risk pools, felt that the current limited scope of the schemes is such that
increased risk pooling – such as combining schemes into regional funds – would bring
few benefits. If hospital cover was to be provided under the schemes in the future,
strategies to ensure greater risk pooling and manage financial risk – such as reinsurance
or government underwriting – would be required. 
Many key informants saw a role for the schemes in providing a safety net to the
poorest to ameliorate the failure of the existing public system to guarantee access to basic
care. This is in line with the objectives of the CBHI schemes themselves, which are
focused on increasing access for vulnerable groups. Others thought that the aim should
be increasing access to care for isolated rural communities and improving the quality of
care available at the most peripheral levels of the health system.
The majority of NGO and village-level key informants felt that community insurance
schemes should seek to promote community involvement in primary care and facilitate
their input into policy debates. Other objectives included ensuring that the state and
communities share responsibility for health care, and improving the quality and
accessibility of care at the peripheral levels of the health system.
The desirability of scaling up community insurance
Equity, efficiency and sustainability considerations
There is considerable evidence in the literature that community financing can
increase access to care,51, 71 and protect low-income populations against the costs of
illness.9,11,68,72 However, many community-run voluntary schemes fail to cover more that
25% of their target populations, which limits their positive equity impacts. Furthermore,
the cost of joining schemes can still be a barrier to the poorest.8,67,70,74,75,76 The affordability
of contributions and availability of subsidies for the poor are key determinants of scheme
equity.54
In Armenia, the average participation rate in the Oxfam insurance schemes is 40%.
A study from 2002 found that the CBHI is mainly reaching the middle-income quintiles;
the richest elect not to join and the poorest cannot afford to participate consistently
(except for the 10% of members who qualify for exemption).131 In Armenia, rural
communities are fairly homogeneous in terms of socio-economic status, and people
move in and out of poverty, as a result it is difficult to target exemptions to those most
in need. However, Oxfam’s existing targeting mechanism, whereby communities
themselves decide who should qualify for exemption (with the exemption list being
revised on a regular basis to allow for the dynamic nature of poverty), is accepted by the
communities as being equitable.  
The scaling up of CBHI schemes nationally also has to be assessed in terms of
sustainability. The revenue that can be generated through the schemes is constrained by
the ability of the population to contribute. Research has shown that affordability, despite
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a modest premium of 2000 AMD (about US$ 4.5) per family per quarter, is currently a
major factor in the low take-up rate.130,131 A balance between raising revenue from
premiums and maintaining equity has to be achieved. Financing, both in terms of
available subsidies and the amounts that contributions could be expected to raise, was
the major constraint identified by many key informants to increasing the scope and
coverage of the schemes:
“There are problems with affordability of the schemes. Contributions are high, and not 
everyone understands the need for them to become more responsible for their own health.”
(KI, central level)
A significant majority of key informants thought it unlikely that the government
would provide subsidies to community insurance:
“The government will not provide subsidies for community-based health insurance. 
Available funds are already being channelled into priority areas that are inadequately funded
currently anyway.” (KI, central level) 
While there is significant support for CBHI at higher policy levels as a way of
increasing service availability for rural communities, this support was contingent on the
schemes being self-funding.
The family medicine schemes supported by the World Bank are financed via
contracting with the State Health Agency (SHA) – the main purchaser of PHC – which
ensures that government funding reaches the ambulatory level. Several key informants
suggested that if the government could be persuaded to recognise CBHI schemes as
provider organisations, the schemes could contract directly with the SHA: 
“…the possibility of STC regional foundations with their associated ambulatories and health
posts to be recognised as a health care provider and allowed to contract directly with the SHA
is attractive. STC would be able to provide the managerial and financial accounting 
functions that independent ambulatories currently find difficult to carry out. It would also be
a useful way of ensuring that per capita funding to cover the basic benefits package at the 
PHC level actually reaches the intended beneficiaries.…it would help achieve the 
government’s and the World Bank’s stated objective of increasing access to the poor, by 
ensuring that funding reaches the most peripheral PHC providers.”
(KI, high level, central)
Contracting with the SHA would contribute to the financial sustainability of the
schemes. However, a number of high-level central key informants were unsure as to the
feasibility of the suggestion.
Several regional-level and a number of NGO key informants suggested that local or
Marz-level government may be able to contribute some funds to help meet the health
needs of the poorest. However, the majority of key informants and FGD participants felt
the most likely source of subsidies for community insurance were NGOs and donors
currently engaged in Armenia, although they recognised that this would mean the
longer term survival of the schemes would be dependent on ongoing external subsidy.
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There was also a strong consensus amongst both members and non-members in the
focus group discussions that affordability was a problem, particularly due to the
seasonality of cash incomes:
“The only reason for not joining is money. If we had money we would join, but our village
is the poorest of the poor.” (FGD, non-members, high participation)
“Funds are the major reason for leaving the scheme. If you have a pensioner in your family,
and they die, you loose that income and you can no longer afford to join the scheme.”
(FGD, non-members, high participation)
If subsidies are insufficient and targeting is ineffective, the poor will be unable to join
the schemes and benefit from the significant external subsidies that the schemes will
require. This would result in the benefits of an expanded programme being captured by
the better off.136
Ensuring sustainability also requires that costs are controlled as schemes are scaled
up.8,9 Key informants pointed out that significant cost savings could be realised via
improving drug procurement and distribution procedures, a view that is supported by the
literature.83,84,85,86,87,122 Drug procurement and distribution is fragmented and inefficient,
with facilities buying their own drugs; there is scope to realise savings through bulk
purchase of commonly used drugs via international tenders. Improving prescribing
practice was also seen to be important. Armenia has an Essential Drugs List which could
be used as the basis for developing more cost-effective prescribing practices. However, in
practice it is not widely used and there is resistance to regulation of prescribing
autonomy. A number of key informants reported that newly developed family medicine
treatment protocols have had little impact because of a failure to encourage the
purchasing of generic drugs or to change provider behaviour.
Discouraging overuse of services covered by a national insurance scheme (addressing
moral hazard) was also seen to be central to cost control, especially if the package of
benefits is to be expanded to include hospital care. Suggested options included the use
of co-payments as well as waiting times between joining a scheme and becoming eligible
for specified benefits.
Considerations related to quality of care
Many key informants recognised that the community insurance schemes in Armenia
have increased the availability and quality of primary care in isolated rural communities,
and there was a consensus that villages not covered by insurance schemes could benefit
significantly from a national scaling up. However, there was a widely recognised need to
increase the scope of services on offer at the health post level and improve the quality
of care (“The major problem currently is access to good quality care; there is access currently
but the care is far from good quality” [KI, central level]), although with increased funding
for PHC health care services, the situation is slowly improving  (“There is a higher
probability that people can get access to PHC for free” [KI, central level]).
As mentioned previously, maternal and child health services at the health post level
are reportedly very poor. This is due to a combination of lack of skills and knowledge, as
well as infrastructure deficits. Reproductive health care is not available from nurses due
to legislative limitations on the clinical role of nurses and resistance from obstetricians
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and gynaecologists to delivering such services via the PHC system. Increased integration
with higher levels of care – through outreach visits by specialists and general
practitioners – was seen as one way to increase the scope of services at health posts. 
The quality of care, as assessed using a standardised ‘quality of care’ check list, found
no significant differences between the health posts that could explain the differing
participation levels. The health post buildings were well maintained and clean and the
clinics were equipped appropriately. Opening times and after-hours emergency care
arrangements were clearly advertised. They all stocked appropriate reference and
education materials. Medical supply and drug storage facilities as well as stock keeping
mechanisms were appropriate and up to date, as were service registers and patient
records. Budget records were similarly well maintained. 
The clinical competence of the nurses, or the quality of care they deliver relative to
other providers, was not assessed directly and it is difficult to draw firm conclusions on
the importance of quality of care measured via proxies. The focus groups and the key
informants suggested that the perceived poor quality of care and the narrow scope of
services covered under the insurance schemes act as important deterrents to membership
for some people:
“You pay a lot and get lower quality care than you would in the hospital.”
(FGD, non-members, low participation)
However, as several regional-level key informants suggested, if the nurse is highly
regarded there are positive incentives for participation in the schemes. A good example
is the nurse in the village with high participation rates who was a trained midwife and
was greatly valued by her community – unusually for Armenia, many local women
request home deliveries because they trust her and because of the excessively high cost
of delivering in hospital: 
“Our nurse is our midwife, our nurse, our doctor. She provides us assistance when we 
need it.” (FGD, members, high participation)
The reliable supply of free essential drugs also contributed to a perception that the
quality of care was good quality. However, FGD participants were not universally
satisfied with the range of drugs on offer: “The reason that I don’t join the scheme is that they
don’t have all the medication that I need” (FGD, non-members, low participation village).
Other participants rejected the demands for more drugs as unrealistic and unaffordable
given the scheme intentions.
The feasibility of scaling up CBHI
Feasibility of increasing service delivery at peripheral levels
As mentioned previously, the health posts currently offer only a limited package of
services that does not include chronic disease management, preventative services such
as screening for hypertension and diabetes (immunisation is a notable exception), or
curative services. This was seen as a major problem, although the increasing use of
scheme-supported outreach visits from specialist and ambulatory-based family medicine
practitioners is helping to remedy this. Furthermore, the limited package of care does not
provide protection against catastrophic health expenditure. Clearly, increasing service
delivery at peripheral levels as part of scaling up CBHI is desirable both to increase the
health impact of schemes and to increase social protection.
Services that should be strengthened at the health post level include: maternal and
child health services; family planning; chronic disease care; simple curative care;
preventative care; and the diagnosis and treatment of STIs. Other services that rural
communities have difficulty accessing include specialist care, dental care and mental
health services. However, to increase service delivery at the peripheral level, significant
broader health system constraints would need to be overcome including degraded
infrastructure (health facilities, roads, water, and sanitation infrastructure) as well as
significant human resource constraints. For this reason, investment in rehabilitating
infrastructure and re-training staff to enable them to deliver a broader scope of services
and increase the quality of care were seen to be important. Existing health sector reform
initiatives, such as the World Bank and USAID-funded programmes, are seeking to
address these issues. 
Another major constraint to increasing the scope and quality of care at the health
posts relates to the resistance of specialists. For example, gynaecologists have a
monopoly on reproductive health services despite an order from the MoH allowing
family medicine trained doctors based in rural ambulatories to do so. Several district-
level key informants pointed out that the gynaecologists are effectively able to veto the
provision of family planning services at peripheral levels. Another constraint was the
knowledge and skills of the nurses themselves:
“There is a need to empower nurses to deliver increased access to PHC services.… There is
a need for family medicine trained nurses at peripheral levels to help correct the human 
resource deficits.” (senior KI, donor agency)
While many NGO and central- and regional-level key informants agreed that there
is a scope to increase the role of health post nurses, and introduce “nurse practitioners”,
there is significant resistance to this idea:
“…there is a powerful community of doctors who would resist the implementation of this 
based on concerns about losing patient contact, quality of care issues, and also the loss of 
income that such change would lead to.” (KI, central level)
A few key informants at the central level pointed out that there are currently legal
constraints that restrict the type of services nurses can deliver and the drugs they can
dispense. A shared-care model was suggested as a possible solution: 
“…it is legally possible for health post nurses to provide medication to patients in accordance
with a prescription from a doctor. Treatment of acute cases could occur via instructions from
doctors received via telephone consultations.” (KI, central level)
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Several key informants pointed out that the major obstacles to introducing nurse
practitioners are technical. To address them would require addressing multiple issues: 
“There are a number of issues that would need to be overcome if this was to become possible,
including infrastructure problems (equipment, transport, communications etc.), the skills 
deficits of nurses, the legislative environment, and their relationship with doctors, and 
financing mechanisms.” (KI, central level)
Increasing the scope of services would require large-scale retraining of currently
practicing nurses and ambulatory doctors. Suggested solutions included incorporating
core PHC clinical skills into the curriculum for new nurses as well as utilising the re-
training programmes developed by the family medicine faculty as part of the World
Bank’s PHC reform project. There is already some movement in this direction; nurses
completing the Family Medicine Programme training will have an increased clinical
role.
Addressing the broader human resource problems such as urban/rural imbalances and
ensuring that there are no legislative barriers to the introduction of family medicine
were also seen to be important:
“There have been recent discussions within the World Bank on what further legislative 
changes will be required to facilitate the widespread introduction of family medicine. Legal 
recognition of the family medicine curriculum is currently dependent on a MoH decree… 
To ensure universal recognition of family medicine qualifications, including regional-level 
recognition, there is need for either a governmental decree or specific legislation.”
(KI, central level)
Compatibility with values, expectations and social capital
The extent to which a scaled-up community financing scheme matches the
preferences of different stakeholders and the levels of social capital within communities
will influence participation in a national-level scheme and therefore the feasibility of
expansion and scaling up. Insurance is a relatively novel mechanism for financing health
care in Armenia – the dominant model is tax-based – which may be problematic from
an acceptability perspective if community financing is rolled out nationally. Some
central-level key informants felt that a poor understanding of insurance would hamper
scaling up CBHI: 
“The population lacks a clear understanding of insurance and the need to pay in advance to
ensure that they can get health care when they need it.” (KI, central level) 
However, the experience of the NGOs running existing CBHI schemes suggests that
this is not an insurmountable constraint – existing schemes have expanded organically
often at the request of communities themselves. However, willingness to pay is clearly
limited by economic uncertainty, poverty, the limited scope of services within the
package and a perception that self-treatment or informal payment may offer better value
for money.131
There is also a persisting belief that health care should be provided by the state,
which would appear to undermine the acceptability of community financing schemes in
Armenia. However, as a number of key informants pointed out, this attitude is changing.
It is increasingly accepted that for the foreseeable future people will have to take some
responsibility for meeting their own health care needs because there are insufficient
funds allocated to health care. Prepayment schemes were seen as being helpful in this
respect. 
The FGDs revealed high levels of social capital; communities in isolated rural villages
in Armenia are close knit and supportive environments. While the FGD participants
had limited trust in the government, they relied on their communities and neighbours,
despite the widespread poverty: “Everyone tries to support each other”; “People are able to
borrow money”; “People support each other in times of need”. The poor and socially
disadvantaged were seen as deserving of assistance, and there was support for exemptions
or subsidies for these groups. Others groups that were seen as especially deserving of
subsidy were people suffering from chronic diseases, and families with many children.
The majority of NGO key informants and FGD participants, as well as many central
key informants, felt that CBHI schemes should remain independent of the government:
“It should be feasible to roll-out CBHI schemes nationally, but technical and managerial 
oversight would be needed. There is no role for the government in this; it should be provided
by NGOs.” (KI, NGO)
However, several key informants envisaged a regulatory role for the government, such
as a need for government-mandated guidelines for expanded community insurance in
order to ensure that they are compatible with overall health sector objectives and
reforms. The need to build linkages and cooperate with government institutions as a
critical part of scaling up local community effort was less commonly mentioned.
Political feasibility
This study demonstrated that there are many stakeholders in the Armenian health
system who are broadly supportive of community-financing initiatives. However, there
was a consensus that the government was unlikely to commit to funding the schemes in
the medium term. Regional-level governments were seen as an essential stakeholder in
scaling up. Strengthening links with them was seen as important as they have significant
power to influence the health service delivery at the regional level and help overcome
the resistance of specialists, and they have some resources that could be used to support
the schemes. There is also a need to secure long-term subsidies to ensure the financial
viability of CBHI.
However, there is opposition to CBHI from entrenched interest groups, including
specialists – who would lose significant income from informal fees and have quality of
care concerns – as well as some hospital and polyclinic administrators: 
“Gynaecologists at the polyclinic were waiting for patients who didn’t come because…the [an
NGO] mobile medical team was providing gynaecological services. The gynaecologists lost 
money as a consequence – about 2,000 AMD per patient. Active resistance resulted in the
form of complaints to the Chief Medical Officer of [the rural] Marz. However, after 
providing an explanation of the services provided by the CBHI schemes and the mission of 
[an NGO], the Marz level government took no action on the complaints.” (KI, NGO)
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Donors and NGOs were supportive of CBHI as a vehicle for mobilising extra
resources, increasing efficiency and consolidating advocacy around pro-poor primary
health care. Their willingness to support CBHI has already been demonstrated through
their financial support of existing schemes.131 However, there is uncertainty as to
whether support for locally run schemes will translate into financial support for scaling
up community financing, as this requires a longer-term engagement with health system
reform. Health professionals at a rural primary care level were very supportive, but those
at higher levels were less so. 
The communities themselves had an extremely favourable opinion of CBHI schemes,
a finding consistent with previous studies.130,131 The schemes are regarded to be working
well, especially in areas where there had previously been no effective state-supported
services: 
“Membership of the CBHI scheme gives people access to a doctor once a month via outreach
visits. The diagnostic services are improved too; people can get ultrasounds now. The scheme
has also improved the facilities at the health post and the availability of drugs. The scheme 
also gives people a sense of security; they know that care is accessible if they need it.”
(KI, village level)
Key informants also identified some stakeholders as being hostile to scaling up CBHI
because they derive benefits from existing arrangements. For example, specialists derive
significant income from informal payments and existing service monopolies. As a result,
they are resistant to: increasing the clinical role of nurses; increasing the delivery of care
at peripheral levels of the PHC system; and to channelling budgetary resources directly
to this level and devolving financing control over budgets. Newly trained family
medicine physicians reported encountering resistance from gynaecologists when seeking
to provide family planning and antenatal care. Attempts have been made to ease this
tension through changes to the legal and regulatory framework, but according to central-
level key informants, more needs to be done. Resistance also exists among the managers
of urban PHC facilities, owners of private pharmacies, as well as regional-level SHA and
MoH representatives. 
There is a widespread view that engaging with and mobilising local communities in
support of CBHI is central to any plans to introduce such schemes nationally: 
“Building trust in communities is central to the success of CBHI schemes… Strategies should
include regular community meetings, more general information campaigns, advertisements,
and building on the reputation of existing schemes.” (KI, NGO)
Several NGO key informants also pointed out that poverty reduction strategies, for
instance implementing livelihoods projects such as micro-credit schemes, education
initiatives, and infrastructure projects (irrigation, water and sanitation), could facilitate
community support of expanded insurance.
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Integrating community financing with the broader health system
Better integration between the community financing schemes and the broader health
system was also seen to be important if the quality and scope of services offered is to be
increased. For example, regional- and village-level key informants frequently cited the
need to improve referral mechanisms and to develop a clearly defined gate-keeping role
for general practitioners.
The use of a shared-care model for conditions like non-insulin dependant diabetes,
under which doctors would provide overall management with local nurses providing
monitoring and dispensing drugs, was frequently cited as a desirable linkage. Again there
were concerns that there would be problems due to lack of skills and resistance by
providers who would have reservations relating to quality of care and the potential loss
of income: 
“The nurses at the health posts lack the necessary skills. If the skills could be improved the 
model could work. It would require more equipment too.” (KI, regional level)
Many key informants supported the idea of outreach visits as a way of increasing
access for rural populations to specialists and general practitioners. As a number of key
informants noted, there are functioning vertical programmes (immunisation
programmes, UNICEF’s forthcoming IMCI and MCH programmes, pilot reproductive
health programmes etc.) which by their very nature provide a link between health posts
and the rest of the health system. These will have a role in ensuring that scaled up
schemes can offer good quality services to their members. 
It was suggested that the supportive supervision model initiated by the
PADCO/ASTP pilot projects could facilitate the integration of the schemes. Under this
model, doctors from ambulatories and polyclinics provide supportive supervision for
health post nurses. In a similar vein, it was suggested that supervision and on-the-job
training could also be provided via family medicine trained doctors:
“Family physicians could help to provide training for health post nurses. Involving health post
nurses in ongoing education programmes at the ambulatory level would be useful. It would
contribute to building a local PHC team, and could be based on the curriculum developed by
the Family Medicine Faculty.” (KI, central level)
Several key informants emphasised the need to develop treatment guidelines.
Ongoing education links between CBHI and other health system levels already exist,
and it was suggested that these could be institutionalised and expanded to support
scaling up CBHI. 
Key informants also felt that linkages should be developed in the areas of health
information systems and data reporting, since community financing schemes will still be
subject to mandatory reporting requirements. This would require that their health
information systems be made compatible with nationally agreed standards.
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Scheme design issues 
The target population, membership basis, contribution levels and benefits package 
There was an almost universal consensus that any expansion of the schemes should
aim to cover isolated rural communities that are more likely to be poor and have
restricted access to primary care. Several key informants also suggested that there could
be a place for CBHI in urban areas with significant concentrations of poverty. The focus
group discussions revealed a strong consensus that compulsory membership was neither
acceptable nor feasible, despite an acknowledgement that it may increase the resources
of the schemes and the scope of services that could be offered. The fundamental problem
is low cash income and vulnerability; people constantly moving in and out of poverty
cannot commit to long-term membership:
“If we don’t have money, how can you make us pay?”
(FGD, non-members, high participation)
“2,000 drams is a lot of money, and in our village there are many poor people who don’t 
have money” (FGD, members, high participation)
There was widespread recognition that financial constraints limit the benefits that
could be offered and the degree of protection:
“Everything depends on the financial capacity of the schemes. First aid is the starting point.
If schemes can be expanded and developed, the package of benefits could be increased, and
it could even include hospital services.” (KI, regional level)
The existing community financing schemes provide mainly basic primary care and
first aid. The community perception is that these are core components of any benefit
package. 
There was significant unmet demand for reproductive health care, which is provided
at district level and involves prohibitive costs. A common suggestion by key informants
was that it should be feasible to cover antenatal and reproductive care as a component
of a health post primary care package. However, this was a matter of some contention,
mainly due to cost considerations. Some key informants did not think that the schemes
should offer family planning or reproductive health services:
“These are not appropriate services for a nurse to deliver. Gynaecologists should deliver these
services since ambulatory doctors and nurses don’t have the necessary skills. Also the 
population would not find it acceptable to have such services delivered by PHC doctors and
nurses.” (KI, regional level)
Most respondents recognise the current limited coverage of chronic diseases as a
major weakness of the schemes. This is due to affordability constraints as well as the fact
that chronic disease management requires integration of services between different
levels of the system and appropriate professional skills.2 In Armenia, the scope of the
services provided at the health post level is restricted by existing centralised patterns of
service delivery: 
“People with chronic diseases receive care from the doctor at the ambulatory; they get their 
drugs from the pharmacy where they often have to pay for the drugs. They can be a burden
on their families; it is difficult to afford the drugs for many people. CBHI should cover these
costs if possible.” (KI, village level)
In the FGDs some thought that the schemes should subsidise the cost of an expanded
benefits package by charging everyone a higher premium, but others felt that increases
would further discourage people from joining: “If people can’t afford to pay now, how will
they afford to pay if you increase the premiums?” (FGD, non-members, intermediate
participation). The idea that people with chronic diseases should be charged more to
join the scheme was felt to be a reasonable strategy: “…people could get access to the
medicine they need… currently they pay anyway” (FGD, non-members, low participation).
Participants in the FGDs were not averse to the idea that CBHI schemes should offer
different packages of care at different prices. However, in terms of hospital cover, FGD
participants recognised that it was beyond the financial capacity of the CBHI schemes.
Some suggested that partial cover of the hospital care costs via a defined cash benefit, or
paying a higher premium for assistance with the cost of emergency transportation to
town, might be feasible, although affordability is still likely to be a constraint:
“Transport is expensive. It costs 15,000 to 20,000 drams [35–45 USS$] to get to the 
hospital. We cannot expect the Oxfam scheme to cover such a cost.”
(FGD, members, low participation) 
A number of key informants at higher policy levels identified a need to tailor the
package of services to local conditions, in particular human resource constraints; the
scope of services that could be offered will be limited by the skills of the health
professionals working at peripheral levels. Others noted that the benefits package should
be tailored to address gaps in government provision, such as shortage of drugs in remote
areas and services not covered by the basic benefits package.
Administrative constraints and management arrangements
The literature highlights the importance of technical support to develop management
capacity and expertise in scheme design if community financing is to be scaled up
successfully. A decade of investment in CBHI in Armenia has developed considerable
expertise in the management of community insurance schemes. However, there are
institutional capacity deficits and strategies need to be developed to remedy them:
“Decentralisation is currently being reversed partly because ambulatories lack managerial 
capacity… similar problems are confronted by community insurance schemes.” 
(KI, high level, central)
The literature suggests that this could be achieved through the setting up of umbrella
organisations providing technical and managerial support to community financing
initiatives.8,62 STC, Oxfam’s partner NGO, has established foundations in two regions
to fulfil this role. It has credibility as an organisation with strong internal accountability
and management systems and could potentially play a role in providing technical and
managerial support to individual CBHI schemes if CBHI is scaled up in Armenia. 
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Implementing a nationwide insurance system would require development of
standardised exemption mechanisms. While community-led exemption mechanisms
have achieved some success in Armenia,137 a uniform exemption mechanism based
exclusively on income would be problematic in rural Armenia – widespread poverty and
a largely non-cash economy combined with socio-economic homogeneity make
targeting difficult.  
Key informants recognised the critical importance of health information systems.
They are central to effective financial management and for monitoring and evaluation
of schemes’ impacts on population health, utilisation and expenditure. Without
adequate health information systems it is difficult to learn lessons from existing schemes
and incorporate them into a national scaling up of community financing. This situation
is starting to change with the Armenian Social Transition Program – supported by
USAID – establishing pilot health information systems at primary care level to enable
the introduction of performance-related financial incentives and quality assurance
mechanisms.
The majority of NGO key informants and many central key informants felt that
CBHI schemes should remain independent of the government; a clear majority of the
FGD participants also supported this position:
“It should be feasible to roll-out CBHI schemes nationally, but technical and managerial 
oversight would be needed. There is no role for the government in this; it should be provided
by NGOs.”(KI, NGO)
The issue of whether the government should have a regulatory role was also raised by
several key informants who identified a need for government-mandated guidelines for
CBHI in Armenia. This was seen as necessary to ensure that such schemes are
compatible with overall health sector objectives and reforms.
Provider payment mechanisms to ensure appropriate incentives
As mentioned previously, most respondents reported that informal payments –
defined as a cash or monetary transaction for a service that users are entitled to138 – are
endemic, especially for hospital care. While formal user fees motivate people to join
community pre-payment schemes since membership protects against having to pay
them, informal payments discourage people from joining since membership provides no
protection against them. A failure to address informal payments when scaling up
community financing would reduce scheme sustainability, decrease the protection
provided by insurance, and undermine coverage. Effectively addressing informal
payments was recognised to be a challenge by key informants: 
“Addressing the issue will require improved salaries for doctors and formalising such 
payments in the fee-for-service structure. There will be significant resistance to changes that
threaten doctors’ income from informal payments.” (KI, central level)
However, a model for addressing them already exists – World Vision have addressed
informal payments by introducing a no-tolerance policy linked to the payment of
bonuses which are dependent on the elimination of informal payments. 
Current provider payment mechanisms are not linked to the quality and quantity of
services provided, which undermines efficiency and creates perverse incentives.
However, community financing programmes have piloted performance-related financial
incentives (Armenia Social Transition Program) which could be incorporated if CBHI
is scaled up. Free riding is also a problem – a representative study from 2002 found that
non-members often access services and obtain drugs that they are not formally entitled
to.131 This issue is complicated by the fact that the communities themselves consider the
practice consistent with solidarity and kinship obligations. Furthermore, everyone is
legally entitled to access health post services which are heavily subsidised by the
schemes (although they are not to obtain drugs or access outreach services provided by
the schemes). 
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VI. Recommendations for Scaling
Up CBHI and Pro-Poor Health
Care Financing in Armenia 
Planning for scaling up CBHI 
• Desirability of CBHI. Comparisons with other countries and the results of the 
qualitative research suggest that there is a role for expanded community-based health
insurance in Armenia. It could contribute to increased funding for PHC, increasing 
access to PHC (and eventually hospital care), and increasing financial protection 
against the cost of illness, provided that the limitations to the existing schemes are 
addressed.
• Setting objectives and agreeing a strategy. It is important to define the objectives 
and priorities of community-based health insurance schemes before scaling them up,
as this will affect their design and the level of investment required. There is a need to
achieve a consensus between different stakeholders in the health sector on what 
trade-offs must be made to enable the schemes to meet their objectives and remain 
affordable. Four further steps are necessary: a comprehensive CBHI scale-up strategy
should be developed; government (and donors) must commit to this action plan, and
provide the necessary support and funding; government (and donors) must 
incorporate the expanded CBHI within the national health sector reform strategies;
and the government should develop an appropriate legislative and policy framework. 
• Involving key stakeholders. Key stakeholders should be identified, with a view to 
securing their support for the process, and involving them in future advocacy.
• Establishing a national forum for rural health and CBHI. This would be useful to 
discuss experience with CBHI as well as rural health issues more generally.
Financing pro-poor PHC and expanded CBHI schemes
• Resource allocations for rural PHC should increase. It is strongly argued that 
current resource allocations based on simple capitation should be replaced by a 
weighted capitation mechanism designed to benefit isolated, poor and vulnerable 
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groups. Mechanisms are required to ensure that existing public funding already 
allocated for PHC reaches peripheral levels of the PHC system.
• Informal payments cannot be tolerated and should be reduced. The endemic 
informal payments for services nominally covered by insurance arrangements will 
significantly diminish the incentives to join voluntary CBHI schemes, and constrain
the scaling up of CBHI in Armenia.
• Subsidising the poor; government and donor subsidies have an essential role to 
play in financially sustaining community financing. Subsidies in the range of 
50–100% of membership costs would be required to ensure that the poorest are able
to join CBHI schemes.
• CBHI schemes should be a component of a broader inter-sectoral development 
strategy. CBHF should be linked to income-generation activities to address poverty 
in rural communities; addressing poverty would enable more people to join the schemes.
• Increasing the amount of revenue generated locally by CBHI schemes is severely
constrained by the levels of poverty and economic development in rural 
communities.
• Preventing financial instability and increasing risk pooling during scaling up.
Establishing district- and regional-level risk pooling via aggregating a number of 
smaller schemes could be well suited to managing such risk pools. Possible inter-
regional risk pooling should be further explored during an expansion. Setting up a 
simple reserve fund would be another feasible and effective solution. Government 
underwriting and reinsurance could be options in the future.
• Expanding population coverage. Poor and isolated rural communities mostly in 
informal employment should remain the primary target group for CBHI. Voluntary 
membership of the CBHI is the only acceptable option currently.
• Determinants of participation in CBHI schemes in Armenia must be monitored in
order to promote enrolment and fine-tune social marketing strategies seeking to 
expand membership. The major factors affecting membership are:
➙ Affordability. This is the major determinant of participation emphasised by 
non-members who were unable to join without sacrificing other essential 
expenditure.
➙ Geographical proximity of services. Outreach specialist services and expanded
service delivery at the health posts is strongly advocated.
➙ Social capital issues. There are high levels of social capital within 
communities, but lower solidarity across communities. This, together with a 
mistrust of government organisations will make it hard to introduce district or
regional risk pools and thus constrains scaling up CBHI. It should be addressed
via information campaigns, involvement of trusted organisations (such as 
Oxfam and STC), and community representatives on financial and 
administrative management boards.
➙ Quality of care. Improving quality of care is essential for encouraging 
membership.
• Expanding the CBHI benefits package. The benefits package should continue to 
focus on covering gaps in existing public provision of services. The current focus of 
the schemes on low cost, high frequency care is appropriate. Without significant 
increases in subsidies to the schemes, the scope for increasing financial protection is
limited. Future increases in the scope of the benefits package should focus initially on
increasing the scope of PHC services covered, with partial cover of hospital-related 
costs being the next logical expansion provided that informal payments are addressed.
• Increasing the scope of services delivered by CBHI schemes and enhancing quality
of care will require significant investment in human resources. Training to enable
the introduction of formally accredited ‘nurse practitioners’ able to deliver a wide 
range of services is strongly recommended; it would also require changes to existing 
legislation. This process could be facilitated through direct support and supervision by
PHC physicians or ‘rural health teams’ consisting of ambulatory doctors and nurses, 
linked to urban-based specialists, family practitioners, and midwives. 
• Motivating health providers working under CBHI schemes. This could be achieved
through providing health post nurses with a living wage as well as financial and non-
financial incentives including mechanisms to ensure holidays and sick leave.
• Quality of care requirements. The government and Medical Associations should 
define quality standards, develop treatment and prescribing protocols, improve the 
regulatory environment, and develop quality assurance strategies such as the 
introduction of peer review. A standard treatment manual for rural practitioners (not
just in CBHI) should be developed and integrated into ongoing training.
• More efficient purchasing and distribution of drugs. Centralised purchasing and 
distribution of drugs could achieve significant cost savings. Strategies associated with
both substantial savings and improved drug availability include: prescribing and 
procurement closely linked to essential drug lists; procurement focused on the use of
generic drugs; procurement via competitive tendering; improved storage; and 
coordinated (or centralised) distribution. 
Scaling up and integration of CBHI: towards institutional sustainability
• It is a strongly held view of communities and key stakeholders that ownership of
CBHI schemes should remain independent of the government. 
• The development of regional umbrella organisations will be required to ensure the
necessary technical support as CBHI is scaled up. The STC foundations in Vayots
Dzor and Syunik already provide technical and managerial support for CBHI 
schemes, and this example could be adapted to other regions or schemes.
• Institutionalising adaptability of CBHF schemes to the changing context is central
to sustainability and their scaling up. Adjusting the scope of benefits covered 
according to the economic environment will be required. Management structures and
premium levels have to evolve as schemes become more complex.
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• The health system itself poses constraints to successfully scaling up community-
based health insurance on a national basis. There are a range of issues linked to 
quality of care, efficiency and cost-efficacy that must be dealt with as part of an 
overall reform package if the introduction of community-based health insurance is to
have an impact. An enabling environment must be created via the implementation 
at national level of health policy initiatives that include investment in infrastructure
and human resources.
• Scaling up CBHI cannot be done in isolation from integration of CBHI within the
broader health system, and there should be stronger integration of clinical services
delivered at different levels. Integration of clinical service delivery can significantly
strengthen schemes, facilitate an increase in the scope of care that can be delivered,
increase the overall efficiency, and facilitate access for rural communities to publicly
funded secondary care. Integration could promote continuity of care between the 
primary and secondary health care levels through mechanisms such as shared care, 
coordinated training and supervision systems, and vertical programmes. 
• An expanding CBHI needs to be marketed: ongoing information and 
communication strategies need to be developed to encourage membership. They 
should clarify the benefits of joining CBHI schemes, and define the rights and 
responsibilities of providers, members, and government.
• Improved and integrated health information systems would support expansion.
They are central to quality control, the introduction of performance-related 
incentives, and enabling evidence-based decision making.
• Improved communication, coordination and partnerships between NGOs, donors
and government departments involved in CBHI and PHC financing is needed. It 
is important that a consensus on advocacy objectives is sought. Furthermore, there 
are opportunities for partnerships and horisontal and vertical integration between 
CBHI schemes themselves and other initiatives. 
Conclusion
In developing countries, the health financing gap remains a significant challenge to
the provision of essential health services. User fees have been ineffective as a tool for
bridging this gap and are now recognised to have had significant negative impacts in
terms of inequity of access and catastrophic health expenditure, especially for poor
people. However, tax-funded health financing and social health insurance, which are
more equitable and ensure access to health care for the wider population, have proved
difficult to institute in resource-poor environments. CBHI in such contexts is seen
increasingly as a reasonable alternative financing mechanism that provides for some risk
pooling and protection against the financial costs of illness.
Community financing is increasingly recognised as an intermediate step towards
expanding risk protection to the entire population. It is no panacea, but it is able to
increase access to care and can reach low-income populations, although the poorest can
still be excluded. Administrative costs are reasonable, and CBHI can help to improve
the quality of care. CBHI reduces out-of-pocket expenditure while increasing utilisation
and improving financial protection. Schemes tend to have participation rates of around
30% and pool risks within low-income populations, which limits the scope for
redistribution from the rich to the poor. They are able to mobilise additional resources,
but their ability to do so is constrained by the low incomes of their members; to be
sustainable and inclusive of the poor, CBHI schemes require external subsidies. They are
more than just a financing mechanism; they can give communities an effective voice in
health policy debates, and popular participation in management makes the schemes
more accountable and responsive to the communities they serve. Most importantly, they
are a step towards health financing systems such as social health insurance that are able
to provide universal access and financial protection.
Some of the effects described above are indeed seen in Armenia, where scaling up
community financing may offer opportunities for improving access for poor rural
populations to good quality primary care.13 The health care reform environment is
favourable given that the two major components of the reform (the introduction of
family medicine and the plans for compulsory social health insurance) have such
obvious synergies with CBHI. Currently, the CBHI schemes that exist in Armenia are
rural and village-based, covering a limited set of PHC services. An increased scope of
services should be delivered at the health post level by the health post nurses or by
ambulatory-based, family medicine trained physicians who are geographically proximate
to the villages where the schemes operate. Ambulatory-based doctors are well positioned
to supervise and support the health post nurses who deliver most of the care under the
CBHI schemes. However, the focus should not be on improving the scheme operation
per se, but on using it as an advocacy platform for communities and their representatives
seeking to promote equitable and pro-poor health system financing.
The proposed social insurance model in Armenia aims to ensure universal access to
health care on the basis of need, to mobilise financial resources for health care, ensure
cross-subsidisation and risk pooling, and promote efficient use of resources. It should be
implemented via a step-by-step approach. The process of rolling out rural community-
based health insurance schemes nationally has obvious synergies with such a strategy, in
terms of its objectives and approach. Given the constraints to the introduction of social
health insurance in the current economic situation, scaling up community financing in
Armenia (with initial donor support) could be an intermediate alternative and a step
towards increasing the accessibility, availability and responsiveness to local needs of
primary health care, gradually extending coverage among the poor and vulnerable
groups, as shown by the international experience.
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Appendices
Figure 1. Life expectancy at birth in Armenia, in years
Source:WHO HFA Database, 2006
Figure 2. Standardised Death Rates from all causes per 100,000, all ages
Source:WHO HFA Database, 2006
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Figure 3. Infant deaths per 1000 live births
Source:WHO HFA Database, 2006
Figure 4. Total health expenditure as % of gross domestic product (GDP), WHO
estimates
Source:WHO HFA Database, 2006
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Figure 5. Private households’ out-of-pocket payment on health as % of total health
expenditure
Source:WHO HFA Database, 2006
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Figures 6–9 below are from: Balabanova D, McKee M, Pomerleau J, Rose R, Haerpfer C. Health
service utilisation in the Former Soviet Union: evidence from eight countries. Health Serv Res 2004;
39:6, Part II: 1927-1949
Figure 6. Percentage paying informally or making a gift during most recent consultation,
by country
Figure 7. Consultation with a health care professional (physician or feldsher) in the
preceding 12 months, by country (of those reporting an illness they felt justified
attendance)
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Figure 8. Location of most recent encounter with a health professional
Figure 9. Would you consult a health professional in the case of … ?
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